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Abstract
Rapidly innovating industries are just not behaving the way theory expected. Conventional
industrial organization theory predicts that when parties in the supply chain have to make
transaction-specific investments, the risk of opportunism will drive them away from
contracts and toward vertical integration. Despite the conventional theory, contemporary
practice is moving in the other direction. Instead of vertical integration, we observe
vertical disintegration in a significant number of industries, as producers recognize that
they cannot themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every field required for the
success of their product. In doing this, the parties are developing forms of contracting
beyond the reach of contract theory models. In this Article, we connect the emerging
contract practice to theory, learning from what has happened in the real world to frame a
theoretical explanation of this cross-organizational innovation and to reconceptualize the
boundaries of the firm accordingly. We argue that the vertical disintegration of the supply
chain in many industries is mediated neither by fully specified technical interfaces that
allow suppliers to produce a modular piece of the ultimate product, nor by entirely implicit
relational contracts supported only by norms of reciprocity and the expectation of future
dealings. Rather, we suggest that the change in the boundary of the firm has given rise to
a new form of contracting between firms - what we call contracting for innovation. This
pattern braids explicit and implicit contracting to support iterative collaborative innovation
by raising switching costs. These costs, represented by the parties’ parallel investment
in transaction specific investment in knowledge about their collaborators’ capacities,
deter opportunism under circumstances when explicit contracting, renegotiation and the
anticipation of future dealings cannot.
Keywords: vertical integration, contracting, switching costs, innovation
JEL Classifications: D23, G34, L14, L23
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CONTRACTING FOR INNOVATION: VERTICAL
DISINTEGRATION AND INTERFIRM COLLABORATION
Ronald J. Gilson,* Charles F. Sabel** & Robert E. Scott***
Forthcoming 109 Colum. L. Rev. (April 2009)
INTRODUCTION

Rapidly innovating industries are not behaving the way theory expects.
Conventional industrial organization theory predicts that when parties in a supply chain
have to make transaction-specific investments, the risk of opportunism will drive them
away from contracts and toward vertical integration.1 The pressure toward vertical
integration will be especially powerful in rapidly innovating industries where swift
technological change produces uncertainty in supply relationships; that is, where the
future states of those relationships cannot be predicted probabilistically.2 In the presence
of uncertainty, contemporary contract theory offers no general solution to the problem of
assuring both efficient levels of transaction-specific investment ex ante and adjustment to

*Marc and Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia University; Charles J. Meyers
Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University; European Corporate Governance Institute.
** Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law, Columbia University.
*** Alfred McCormack Professor of Law and Director, Center for Contract and Economic
Organization, Columbia University.
We are especially grateful to Victor Goldberg, who made very substantial contributions
to this article. George Geis, Michael Klausner, Richard Langlois, Curtis Milhaupt, Richard
Nelson, Daniel Raff, Alan Schwartz, Yane Svetiev and George Triantis provided helpful
comments on an earlier draft. We also appreciate the support of the Kauffman Foundation.
1
Much of this transaction-cost literature is an extension of the work of Oliver Williamson. See
e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985); Oliver E.
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975); Oliver E.
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: the Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J. L. &
Econ. 233 (1979
2
The reference here is to uncertainty in Knightian terms. See e.g., Frank H. Knight, Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit (1921). In Knight’s usage there is risk when alternative future states of the
world occur with quantifiable probability: the future can be expressed as a probability
distribution. Since we can through insurance and other means mitigate or even eliminate the
effects of unfavorable states, a risky world is one in which we can with near certainty live in the
conditions we choose. The Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty is a useful way to
illustrate the way accelerating technology and global competition have created unique
circumstances that resist probabilistic classification. Id. at 197-232.
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an efficient outcome ex post after uncertainty is resolved.3 When contract cannot address
opportunism successfully, firms should dominate markets as a means to organize supply
relationships.

Despite conventional industrial organization theory, however, contemporary
practice is moving away from vertical integration. Producers recognize that they cannot
themselves maintain cutting-edge technology in every field required for the success of
their product. Accordingly, companies are increasingly electing to acquire by contract
components that in the past they would have made themselves. Thus, instead of vertical
integration, we observe vertical disintegration in a significant number of industries. In
the process of vertically disintegrating, firms are developing forms of contracting beyond
the reach of contract theory models.

To explain the incursions of contract on the domain of the vertically integrated
firm, some theorists emphasize “modularity,” The claim is that new production tools
permit parties to more or less standardize the interface between separate stages (or
modules) of production.4 Each module can serve many purposes and therefore fit a
variety of different products. The result is a moderation in the intensity of firm-specific
investments and corresponding reductions in the risk of opportunism and thus in the need
for vertical integration. Despite its apparent benefits, however, modularity is a doubleedged sword: It may trap a firm in a no-longer-competitive technology.5 To avoid the
“modularity trap,” firms instead are engaging each other in a process of iterative
collaboration and co-design of both the interface and the components it joins.

3

Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The
Evidence, 45 J. Econ. Lit. 629, 649 (2008) (hold-up problem “clearly pose[s] problems for longterm contracting, and those problems are exacerbated in volatile environments”) See TAN __
infra.
4
See Richard N. Langlois, The Vanishing Hand: The Changing Dynamics of Industrial
Capitalism, 12 Indus. & Corp. Change 351 (2003).
5
Henry Chesbrough, Towards a Dynamics of Modularity: A Cyclical Model of Technical
Advance, in Andrea Prencipe, Andrew Davies, and Michael Hobday (eds.), The Business of
Systems Integration 181 (2004).
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In view of these developments, other theorists suggest that this collaborative
process that replaces vertical integration is governed by relational contracting rather than
modularity.6 Here the focus is on the dominance of non-contractual social and network
bonds and informal cooperation as the mechanisms that support collaboration by
constraining opportunism. But neither of these polar alternatives fits the contracting
forms that disintegrated firms have devised to cope with the continuing uncertainty
caused by rapid technological change.

What we see instead is a rich braiding of explicit (i.e., legally enforceable)
obligations, together with implicit (i.e, non legally enforceable) obligations that establish
formal governance structures regulating the exchange of highly revealing information,
but do not necessarily impose legally enforceable obligations actually to buy and sell
products. This braiding creates an interactive process that constrains opportunism as the
parties’ investments in detailed knowledge of their respective character and capabilities
raise switching costs---the costs one party to a contract must incur in order to replace the
other party to the contract.7

In this Article, we seek to connect the emerging contract practice to theory,
learning from what has happened in the real world to frame a theoretical explanation of
this cross-organizational innovation and to reconceptualize the boundaries of the firm
accordingly. We argue that the vertical disintegration of the supply chain that we observe
in many industries is mediated neither by fully specified explicit contracts that allow
suppliers to produce a modular piece of the ultimate product nor by entirely implicit
relational contracts supported only by norms of reciprocity and the expectation of future
dealings. Rather, we suggest that the changes in firm boundaries are mediated by a new
form of contracting---what we call “contracting for innovation.”8
6

Contracting for

Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Toward a new Synthesis of
American Business History, 108 Am. Hist. Rev. 404 (2003).
7
See discussion TAN supra.
8
Lafontaine et. al., supra note __ provide a useful survey of the theory and empirical studies of
the vertical integration decision and the consequent boundary of the firm. However, the authors
limit their attention to polar definitions of contract and vertical integration, explicitly excluding
consideration of the intermediate collaborative case that we argue is central to understanding the
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innovation supports iterative collaboration between firms by interweaving explicit and
implicit terms that respond to the uncertainty inherent in the innovation process: The
inability of the parties to specify ex ante the nature of the product to be produced or its
performance characteristics means that the terms of performance will be determined by
the very governance process the contract creates.

As with the conventional account of the forces pushing toward vertical
integration, opportunism plays a central role in explaining the organization of
disintegrated innovation in the supply chain, but it is of a character somewhat different
than in the conventional vertical integration literature, and is addressed in a radically
different fashion---the process of collaboration itself erects a barrier to taking advantage
of the other party’s specific investments.

More precisely, as the parties invest in

developing information about their respective capabilities, the cost of switching partners,
and therefore the constraint on opportunism, goes up in tandem.

This Article proceeds in five parts. We begin our discussion in Part I with an
account of the ongoing vertical disintegration of the supply chain in innovative industries
and consider various theoretical accounts of the process before offering our own
assessment. Part II moves to a review of contract theory and its inability to offer a
general solution to the canonical contracting problem of ensuring both the efficient level
of specific investment in the face of uncertainty and efficient production once the
uncertainty is resolved. Part III then describes three real world exemplars that illustrate a
continuum of contracts that support collaborative innovation. We use these transactional
exemplars in Part IV to frame, but not to prove, our theoretical account of contracting for
innovation. In Part V, we return to the theory of the firm and suggest the need to
acknowledge that there is no theory of the firm. Following Bengt Holmström and John

new transactional structure that supports collaborative innovation. See id. at 631 (We “do not
question the definition of vertical integration and markets that is used in empirical studies. In
most cases, this implies that we equate contracts with arms length transactions and contrast firms’
decision to rely on such transactions versus vertical integration.”)(citations omitted).
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Roberts,9 we argue that the organizational boundaries of production, and the techniques
that govern conduct within and across those boundaries, represent a variety of
mechanisms that evolve in response to changes in the firm’s real activities and in the
problems the firm must address. We conclude that future work investigating parties’
efforts to contract for innovation requires both qualitative and quantitative data sufficient
either to give confidence that our account captures current practice or to instruct us on
what we have missed.

I. VERTICAL DISINTEGRATION AND COLLABORATION AMONG FIRMS: INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD

In the last two decades, the organization of firms in the U.S. and other advanced
economies has changed in two fundamental ways. First, many kinds of transactions that
used to take place within firms—the manufacture of key parts or components, assembly
of final products, and research leading to new ones—are now organized by agreements
between firms. There is thus a decrease in the proportion of economic activity
coordinated within firms and a corresponding increase in the proportion of economic
activity conducted through contract in the market.10 Second, market transactions between
firms increasingly involve novel forms of collaboration—particularly rich and carefully

9

Bengt Holmstrom & John Roberts, The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited, 12 J. Econ. Persp. 73
(1998).
10
The fact of vertical disintegration is not controversial. Thus, while Langlois and Lamoreaux et.
al. disagree about both the causes and the response, each treats the phenomenon as fact. Richard
N. Langlois, Chandler in Historical Perspective: Markets, Transaction Costs, and Other
Organizational Form in History, 5 Enterprise & Society 355 (2004). (“In 1977, ... the large,
vertically integrated ‘Chandlerian’ corporation had dominated the organizational landscape for
nearly a century. ... A quarter of a century later, however, the Chandlerian firm no longer
dominates the landscape.”); Naomi R. Lamoreaux et. al., Against Whig History, 5 Enterprise &
Society 376, 377 (2004) (“By the end of the twentieth century, it had become clear that ... the
acme of capitalist development – the large, vertically integrated, horizontally diversified,
managerially directed corporation – was clearly in retreat.”).
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organized exchanges of information designed to identify and utilize possibilities for
innovation. We label this novel collaborative form: “contracting for innovation.”11

This collaborative innovation is not just a shift from hierarchy (organization of
transactions within firms) to contract. Rather, we will argue that the unavoidable mutual
vulnerabilities among collaborators motivate corresponding innovations in contractual
governance to support the new transactional structure. In this Part, we briefly canvass
the most salient evidence for the shift away from hierarchically organized transactions to
interfirm collaborative innovation; speculate on the reasons for it; and present two
contrary, but similarly incomplete accounts of current economic organization to
underscore the novelty of the simultaneously formal and informal mechanisms by which
firms learn to innovate together.

A. Vertical Integration and the Chandlerian Firm
For much of the 20th century, the dominant firms in industries such as steel,
automobiles, electric machinery and food processing, both in the U.S. and worldwide,
used the technologies of the second industrial revolution12 to achieve dramatic economies
of scale through the mass production of standard goods with single-purpose or dedicated
machinery. The most conspicuous organizational feature of firms in these industries was
vertical integration: The manufacturer of the final good was likely to own upstream
producers of key inputs, or downstream distributors, or both.

Vertical integration was a response to the threat of disruption to the production
process. Because achieving economies of scale entailed large specific investments in
production equipment that had little or no value unless used for the purpose to which it
was dedicated, interruptions in the flow of production could be ruinous. In the familiar
phrase of Alfred D. Chandler, the pre-eminent historian of the mass-production firm, the

11

The discussion that follows draws on Charles R. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither Modularity
nor Relational Contracting: Inter-Firm Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 Enterprise &
Society 388 (2004).
12
Michael J. Piore & Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity
(1984).
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“visible hand” of managerial hierarchy supplanted market exchange as the organizing
agent when potential costs of disruption grew.13

Economists, following Oliver Williamson, interpreted the vertical integration of
the Chandlerian firm as a response to a particular class of potential disruption: the threat
of hold-ups inherent in co-specialized or “specific” investments.14 When the value of two
independently controlled investments is mutually dependent, each investor tries to induce
the other to invest first in order to extract more favorable terms once an irrevocable
commitment has been made.15 Placing both assets under the control of a single owner—
vertical integration—unblocks this logjam. Much of the most interesting work in the
theory of the firm since the 1980s explores the conditions under which parties to
investments in inter-dependent assets can allocate initial contractual rights so that the one
best able to maximize the joint value of the investment is in a position to bargain for
exclusive control once it becomes clear what conditions actually prevail.16

B. The Vertical Disintegration of the Chandlerian Firm: The Shift from Risk to
Uncertainty
Current developments in industrial organization make the historical dominance of
the Chandlerian firm and the view that the resolution of the hold-up problem is decisive
to the structure of the firm rather anachronistic. Instead, a current observer sees
something radically different: the dis-integration of vertical combinations in sectors
where they once seemed irrevocably established, or the exploration of collaborative
alternatives to full integration in domains unencumbered by their legacy. In certain
economically significant sectors, fear of hold-ups, at least in their traditional form, no
longer compels firms to vertically integrate.

13

Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business
(1977).
14
See note – supra.
15
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies, supra note 1; Williamson, The Economic Institutions of
Capitalism, supra note 1.
16
See Part II infra.
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U.S. automobile makers, such as General Motors, whose acquisition of suppliers
in the 1920s were often invoked to illustrate the imperatives of vertical integration,17 have
divested many of their internal component makers and emulated more competitive
Japanese firms whose success has depended on close, continuing collaboration with a
wide range of sophisticated outside suppliers. Similarly, pioneers of the mainframe
computer industry, such as IBM, which initially modeled themselves on vertically
integrated industrial firms, have sold internal makers of key components and now
routinely purchase from outsiders devices they long insisted on making themselves.
Many of the more recently founded firms in the personal-computer industry make none
of the key components themselves and organize final assembly by agreement with
specialized “contract manufacturers” (who also play a role in product design).18 A
sprawling literature on the modularization of production and the globalization of supply
chains investigates this decentralization and the organizational disintegration that
accompanies it.19

The disintegration of production, moreover, is not limited to the manufacture of
physical goods. The production of knowledge needed to define and realize new
generations of products is also illustrated by the decreasing importance of the large,
centralized laboratory in industries, such as pharmaceuticals and telecommunications,
where it was pioneered. Today, research is likely to be conducted by an ad hoc
consortium of firms of very different sizes, often including publicly funded laboratories
as well, all contributing highly specialized, complementary expertise.20 It is now routine
17

See e.g., Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher BodyGeneral Motors Relationship Revisited in The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution and
Development 213 (O. Williamson & S. Winter eds., 1991); Benjamin Klein, Fisher-General
Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J. L. & Econ. 105 (2000); Ronald Coase, The Conduct of
Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General Motors, 15 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 255
(2006).
18
Dave Nelson et al., The Purchasing Machine: How the Top Ten Companies Use the Best
Practices to Manage Their Supply Chains (2001); Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network
Forms of Organization, 24 Ann. Rev. Socio. 57, 68 (1998).
19
Gary Gereffi, et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 Rev. Intl. Pol. Econ. 78
(2005); Timothy J. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks: A New American Model of
Industrial Organization, 11 Indus. & Corp. Change 451 (2002).
20
Richard S. Rosenbloom & William J. Spencer, eds., Engines of Innovation: U.S. Industrial
Research at the End of an Era (1996).
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for a large pharmaceutical company with, say, expertise in the metabolic pathways that
produce a particular pathology, to search for therapeutic compounds in concert with a
small start-up company that has developed tools for identifying, among billions of
possibilities, the classes of molecules most likely to correct the metabolic defect without
producing toxic side effects.21

At the intersection of both these developments---dis-integration of physical
production into chains of component suppliers and the collaborative networking of
research---is the “platform” organization of production. Consider a computer operating
system, a current-model cell phone, or an airliner like the Boeing 787. In each case, the
performance of the product depends on the performance of a series of independently
produced and rapidly developing subsystems—microprocessor, web browser, media
players, and other applications in the case of an operating system; digital signal
processor, radios, and antennas for various frequencies in the case of a cell phone; wings,
engines, and fuselage in the case of planes.22 The performance of each of these
subsystems depends conversely on the performance of the others, as transmitted through
the architecture---the platform---linking them all.

In each case, the platform owner---the operating system developer, the cell phone
maker, or the airframe producer---knows that it could not possibly produce all or even
most of the components or applications whose interplay creates the platform. In
particular, the producer could not develop or sustain the capacity for cutting edge
innovation in all the areas necessary for the various components. Collaboration with
groups of key technology suppliers, involving continuing mutual adjustment and
exchange of quintessentially proprietary knowledge becomes the norm.23 Thus, the

21

Bruce Kogot et al., Interfirm Cooperation and Startup Innovation in the Biotechnology
Industry, 15 Strat. Mgmt. J. 387 (1994); Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational
Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 Admin.
Sci. Q. (1996).
22
Annabelle Gawer & Michael A. Cusumano, Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft and
Cisco Drive Industry Leadership (2002).
23
Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies:
Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1
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recent emergence of a literature on platform industries and the forms of predation that
tempt platform owners attests to the diffusion of enduring (though sometimes fraught)
cooperation across firm boundaries just as the literature on modules and global value
chain attests to the decline of vertical integration.24

The replacement across a wide range of industries of vertically integrated firms by
inter-firm collaboration thus poses a critical question: What accounts for the decline of
vertical integration and the nature of the collaboration that is displacing it?

Just as stability is the precondition of mass production and vertical integration,
instability and the volatility of markets has been their bane. The connection between
stability, mass production, and vertical integration was suggested above: The high fixed
costs associated with specific investments can only be amortized over long production
runs. The larger the expected demand, the greater the volume of investment that can be
financed and the larger the economies of scale that can be achieved. External shocks to
markets, or systemic sources of instability, conversely, deter investments in the tightly
linked, dedicated equipment that makes mass production possible even as it creates the
potential for holdups and so induces vertical integration. As Adam Smith, thinking of the
economies of scale attained in the pin factories of his day put it, “The division of labor is
limited by the extent of the market.”25

Future generations of economic historians will no doubt clarify the circumstances
that first encouraged the progression of the vertically integrated mass production firm and
that then cut the ground from under it. For present purposes, one set of developments is
(2003); David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi- Sided Platform Markets, 20 Yale J.
Reg. 325 (2003).
24
David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in
Dynamically Competitive Industries, 2 Innovation Policy and the Economy 1 (J. L. Jaffe & S.
Stern eds., 2001); Jean- Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two- Sided Markets: An Overview, (IDEI
Working Paper, 2004) available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/ep_rochetover.pdf.
David S. Evans et al., A Survey of the Economic Role of Software Platforms in Computer-Based
Industries, (CESIFO Working Paper No. 1314, October 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=618982 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
25
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776).
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especially relevant. Beginning roughly in the 1980s and continuing today, the profusion
of new technological possibilities associated with what is loosely called “the information
revolution” operated to intensify the systemic uncertainty faced by producers.
Innovations cascaded, often leading to improvement cycles that became self-perpetuating
and ultimately transformative in the possibilities for new applications they afforded. The
computer itself is a prime example: Increases in computational power led to improved
tools for the design of microprocessors, more sophisticated materials and more exacting
manufacturing techniques for realizing the new designs. These improvements then led to
further increases in the power of computers, and the cycle then replayed.

This increasing unpredictability is manifest as the pervasive fear of what Clayton
Christensen calls “disruptive” technologies.26 A disruptive technology is a superior
alternative to the currently dominant know-how in a particular domain that devalues the
skills of incumbent industry leaders. But because the disruptive technology reflects a
starkly different approach rather than a linear improvement of the dominant method, the
best producers and most sophisticated consumers of the dominant method initially are
blind to the disruptive technology’s potential and to the threat it represents. Precisely
because their experience teaches how to improve on what they already know and to
provide what their similarly focused customers believe they need, dominant producers do
not see a threat coming from an entirely different direction. Disruptive technologies
therefore typically get footholds in secondary or peripheral markets of no interest to the
dominant players or their customers. They are then generalized to core domains of
application, dislodging the incumbent producers.27 In the heyday of vertical integration,
incumbency was the goal, allowing firms to see over the horizon of technical
development and providing, through economies of scale, the means to realize the
possibilities they saw. Now incumbency is seen as a burden, proficiency with current
technologies obstructing the view of future directions. Precisely the organizational

26

Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997).
Examples of this phenomenon include electric-arc or mini-mill steel producers, hydraulically
activated earth-moving equipment, or, in the realm of general production technologies—Japanese
or lean production methods. Id. at ---. Christensen argues—unchallenged, so far as we know—
that all established technologies are in principle disruptable in this way.

27
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capabilities that underlie success in the industry as currently understood blind the firm to
threats from outside of the dominant conception.28

If increasing uncertainty is inimical to integrated forms of industrial organization
based on specific investments, we should find disintegrated forms in uncertain
environments. We do. Two of these responses—industrial districts (or “clusters”) and
systems engineering—are especially interesting here. Each provides guidance in
understanding the form of interfirm cooperation that has developed in the postChandlerian economy, and which is our focus in this Article.

First consider clusters or industrial districts. Clusters are geographically compact
agglomerations of small and medium sized firms in an industry characterized by volatile
or rapidly shifting demand, all of which specialize in a particular phase of production or a
production process. Finished goods are produced by groups of firms collaborating in
rapidly shifting constellations.29 By recombining and thereby augmenting fragmented,
specialized, and mostly tacit knowledge, a multiplicity of cooperative firms in a cluster
adapts rapidly to changes in the economic environment. Agglomerations of this kind
played an important role in the industrialization of parts of Europe and the United States
from the late 18th century onwards.30 Variants are common in more recent industrializers
ranging from Japan to Taiwan to Brazil to Kenya, and in the development of Silicon
Valley.31 Since the turbulence in the markets for mass produced goods in the mid-1980s

28

The replacement of the centralized research laboratory, where stable project groups could
pursue a line of research for a decade or more, by ad hoc research consortia that connect expertise
from disjoint domains reflects this transformation. See Christensen, supra note – at –.
29
Up to some limit, the more firms in a cluster, the easier it is for each firm to find the partners it
needs, the lower its costs of production. Up to the size limit, therefore, firms in a cluster
constitute positive externalities for each other. The attraction of these positive externalities is
(part of) what draws firms to the cluster in the first place, causing agglomeration. See Paul
Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 483 (1991); Edgar M.
Hoover and Raymond Vernon Anatomy of a Metropolis: The Changing Distribution of People
and Jobs within the New York Metropolitan Region (1959).
30
See Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass
Production In Western Industrialization (1997).
31
On Japan, see David Friedman, The Misunderstood Miracle: Industrial Development And
Political Change In Japan (1988); on Silicon Valley, see AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage:
Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (1994), and Ronald J. Gilson, The
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made valuable the ease with which clustered firms could recombine as conditions
changed, clusters are a microcosm of the “new” economy, able to prosper in much more
volatile conditions than the vertically integrated large corporation.

Systems engineering also facilitates cooperation, but in contrast to free-form
combinations of clusters, it supports formalized cooperation among very large firms to
produce complex products in very uncertain technological environments. Systems
engineering emerged in the U.S. after World War II to develop weapons systems at the
then frontier of technological capability.32 Since no single firm could produce, say, both
the inertial guidance system and the rocket motor needed for a missile, coordination of
specialist “subsystem” suppliers was necessary. Responsibility for the elaboration of the
initial design and its refinement in collaboration with the specialist suppliers was
entrusted to a prime contractor. Related methods of systems integration elaborated in
response to current conditions are common today at the (vastly extended) technical
frontier.33

C. Alternative Characterizations of the Emergent Institutional Framework: Modular,
Relational, and Iterative Collaboration
The preceding examples buttress the claim that disintegrated industrial
organization is a creature of context—and in particular a response to uncertain
environments. However, they suggest quite different and inconsistent interpretations of
how “disintegrated” firms cooperate. Cooperation in the clusters is extremely fluid; the
creation of new firms, the re-contracting among existing ones, and the circulation of
Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 575 (1999); on Taiwan, see AnnaLee Saxenian,
The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy (2006); on Brazil and Latin
America, see Elisa Giuliani et al., Upgrading in Global Value Chains: Lessons from Latin
American Clusters, 33 World Develop. 549 (2005); and on Italy, see Roberta Rabellotti, Anna
Carabelli & Giovanna Hirsch, Italian Industrial Districts on the Move: Where are they Going?
(forthcoming European and Planning Studies, 2008).
32
These weapon systems included the Polaris submarine-launched intercontinental ballistic
missile, its land-based counterpart, the Minuteman, and the DEW line early-warning radar
system.
33
See, for example, the relation between Intel, the microprocessor manufacturer, and the
suppliers of its chip-making equipment. Best, The Geography of Systems Integration, in Prencipe,
Davies and Hobday, The Business of Systems Integration at 209-210.
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skilled workers from firm to firm is continuous. Organization seems highly informal,
indeed nearly spontaneous. Mutual trust, born of long and close observation of actual
behavior, underpins complex transactions memorialized in a handshake. In contrast, the
organization of cooperation in systems engineering is highly formalized. Design
parameters are specified in great detail and translated into precise formal contractual
obligations with the intent of rendering the transaction as explicit as possible. Informality
is treated as an unruly threat to exchange, not its foundation. Each of these examples has
helped inspire a current but quite distinct interpretation of the disintegrated industrial
organization emerging today.

1. Modular Collaboration. --- One interpretation, advanced in the work of
Richard Langlois, elaborates and generalizes the experience of systems engineering.34 Its
central claim is that the availability of the new tools of design and production allow the
development of technical standards or design rules that standardize the interfaces
between organizationally separate stages of production. This standardization of
interfaces is thought to so reduce the volume of information required for inter-firm
coordination that products can be decomposed into distinct modules, all of which can be
produced in virtual isolation from the others.35 Each producer need know only the
interface that connects its contribution to the product; it need know little about the other
components or interfaces. At the extreme, one can think of a “Lego-like” manufacturing
process, with different firms producing differently shaped, sized, and colored pieces, all
linked by a common form of connection. In Langlois’ view, the formulation of standards
and modules, periodically refined, now allows firms to achieve economies of scale and
scope through the market rather than through the Chandlerian firm. Langlois focuses,
however, only on the opportunity for market substitutes to vertical integration; he does
not address the form those arrangements actually take.36
34

Richard N. Langlois, supra note __.
Id. at 374.
36
Langlois, Chandler in a Larger Frame, supra note __. While Langlois acknowledges that much
of the market substitutes for vertical integration cannot be reduced to “hard modularity,” he is
explicit that he “is not really attempting to pronounce on which specific kinds of contractual
arrangements constitute the New Economy. My claim is only that they are ‘market’
arrangements in the broad sense ....” Richard Langlois, Rejoinder, 5 Enterprise & Soc. 404, __
35
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2. Relational Collaboration. --- A contrary interpretation, advanced by Naomi
Lamoreaux, Daniel Raff, and Peter Temin is, in turn, a variant of the stylized experience
of the industrial districts or clusters.37 They see the new economy as a shift away from
coordination by managerial hierarchies in vertically integrated firms towards
coordination through long-term relationships, based on “informal restraints on selfinterested behaviour,” among networks of formally separate firms.38 Where Langlois
emphasizes the resurgence of the market over the visible hand of management,
Lamoreaux, Raff and Temin emphasize the resurgence of social bonds as the
underpinnings of economic relations. In the pre-Chandlerian era, they write, “business
people in industrial communities interacted socially as well as economically, and the
resulting multidimensional relationships facilitated cooperation for purposes besides
production.”39 Relational coordination is possible again today, they argue, because cost
reductions in transportation and communications allow multi-dimensional relationships to
develop at a distance, which give decentralized networks of firms the flexibility to
respond to the increasingly differentiated demands of consumers. These flexible
relationships are of particular value “where there is a great deal of uncertainty about the
direction of technological change and both parties can benefit from the pooling of
information and resources that trust makes possible.”40 Put another way, the chief
advantage of formal disintegration of the firm is to create the possibility for sustained
informal cooperation between independent producers, a different vector from the highly
formalized exchanges stressed by Langlois.

We share Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin’s recognition that uncertainty has driven
the disintegration process, and agree that relationships between firms substitute for

(2004). As he puts it in Langlois, The Vanishing Hand, supra note___, at 376, “As a central
tendency, however, the buffering functions of management are devolving to the mechanisms of
modularity and the market — informational decomposition, flexibility, and risk spreading.”
37
Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies, supra note __.
38
Id. at —.
39
Id. at 34.
40
Id. at 11.
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vertical integration. However, the critical point from our perspective is to understand
these relationships: How is collaborative innovation organized?41

3. Iterative Collaboration. --- Examining the limits of modularity, and how firms
address those limits, calls attention to a type of cooperative institution—more formal than
“relationships,” but designed to facilitate learning among collaborating peers by means
much less formal than hierarchical ordering. This mid-range institutional form, neither
purely relational nor based on a hierarchical specification of modular interfaces, is
indispensable to cooperation among firms in “platform” settings, modern supply chains,
or collaborative research and development. Given the relentless innovation of the
modern economy, it is unsurprising that there are costs as well benefits to fixing
standards for technical interfaces for components and modules. In the short term, the cost
is a sacrifice in performance of the product as a whole. Because the standard setter itself
cannot observe the technological cutting edge across every field, the standards specified
will be less ambitious than the outcome of a collaborative process among parties who are
at the cutting edge. In a careful study of the hard disk drive industry, for example,
Christensen found that only at the low-performance end of the market could the
performance of finished products be completely predicted from the performance of their
component modules.42 Thus, modularization is not a stable strategy because it leaves
open too many possibilities for competitive improvements that would cumulatively
undermine the initial interfaces.43

41

Lamoreaux, Raff and Timins describe the new transaction patterns that have arisen to substitute
for vertical integration in the late twentieth century as “repeat interactions in which the parties
involved made decisions about price and about the quality and quantity of output through a
process of negotiation.” Lamoreaux et. al., Against Whig History, supra note __at 384).
However, this characterization does not advance the matter. That the resolution is through
negotiations is either tautological – in the absence of a fully state contingent contract how else
could the response to uncertainty be resolved – or simply under theorized because current
contract theory provides no guide as to how that renegotiation would take place. See TAN __
infra
42
Clayton M. Christensen, Matt Verlinden, and George Westerman, 11 Indus. & Corp. Change
955 (2002) (2002) (In the hard disk industry, only in the low-performance end of the market
could the performance of finished products be predicted from the performance of their component
modules)...
43
There are, moreover, long-term costs to modularity in that a commitment to particular interface
standards can lock component and end-product manufacturers into obsolescent product
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In contrast to modular interfaces specified by the standard setter, an interesting set
of firms engage in a process of iterative co-design, in which suppliers contribute to the
redefinition of interface specifications for new products by building on their experience
in manufacturing existing models. These disciplines of iterated co-design are neglected
both by those who stress modularization and by those who find those connections in
informal relationships; in the former they are ignored, and in the latter they are underspecified.

Iterated co-design establishes a first idea of what and how to produce through
benchmarking: an exacting survey of current products and processes, augmented by
assessments of promising new techniques. From this provisional starting point, each
party responsible for a constituent component proposes modifications of the initial plan,
having taken into account the implications of like proposals by the other subunits for its
own activities. This process—radically decentralized compared to the coordination
provided by the prime contractor in systems engineering—is often called simultaneous
engineering. Provisional designs are then evaluated and refined. Once production
begins, systems of error detection and correction focus on breakdowns in the new
routines to trigger a search for weaknesses of the design or production process that
escaped earlier examination. This root cause analysis traces disruption back to its original
source, presumed to be distant from the proximate cause of the breakdown. Participant
firms must routinely question the suitability of their current routines and continuously
readjust their approach in light of the contributions of their collaborators.44

Taken together, these iterative, cooperative techniques play an important part in
shaping the links that connect firms in the vertically disintegrated economy. As each
architecture. This is what Chesbrough calls a “modularity trap.” Henry Chesbrough, Towards a
Dynamics of Modularity: A Cyclical Model of Technical Advance, in Andrea Prencipe, Andrew
Davies, and Michael Hobday (eds.), The Business of Systems Integration 181 (2004). In the firm,
“the focus on developing products to compete within the standard eventually erodes the amount
of system-level knowledge.” Id. at __.
44
For a fuller discussion, on which this presentation draws, see Susan Helper, John Paul
MacDuffie, and Charles F. Sabel, Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While
Controlling Opportunism, 9 Indus. & Corp. Change 443 (2000), and Charles F. Sabel, A Realtime Revolution in Routines, supra note --.
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collaborating party monitors and learns from the others’ participation in the process,
observation renders tacit knowledge at least partly explicit, easing long-range
collaboration (by reducing the chances that the parties take incompatible things for
granted) and reducing the chance that all the parties cling to limiting assumptions held by
any single party.

Moreover, these methods also address the governance problems arising from the
mutual vulnerability inherent in such open-opened collaboration among different entities.
The exchanges of information required for benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and
error detection and correction increases the mutual transparency of the actors to each
other, revealing to each how rigorously and cooperatively the others scan for solutions in
addressing joint problems of design or quality. By such monitoring, the parties learn
their counterparty’s capabilities to operate in this transactional structure and to perform
the substantive tasks required for the particular product. This framework establishes the
position to which we now turn. In the next section, we address the contractual structure
of collaborative innovation: how learning by monitoring is institutionalized in forms of
contractual governance that allow the parties to rapidly establish confidence in one
another’s intentions and in their joint capacity to accomplish the tasks they set for
themselves.

II. THE CONTRACTING RESPONSE: COPING WITH CONTINUOUS UNCERTAINTY

In Part I, we described the effects of continuing technological change on
contemporary economic organization. In some markets and for some products, increases
in the complexity of the technology and in the rate of change have made it difficult for a
single firm to sustain state of the art capacity across all the technologies necessary for
successful product development. The response has been collaborative innovation across
organizational boundaries with, for example, upstream and downstream participants in
the supply chain specializing in particular technologies and the ultimate product resulting
from cooperation among different organizations, each having contributed their special
expertise.

This on-going process of vertical disintegration has stimulated the
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development of networks of explicit contracts among collaborating firms. In this part, we
argue that conventional contract theory cannot explain this process.

These emerging contractual networks are incompatible with the models of
economic organization that purport to describe the modern production process. On the
one hand, the explicit contracts that govern these new collaborative relationships do not
fit the central tendency toward modularity described by Langlois; a model that has as an
end point (relatively) complete contingent contracting that specifies the relevant
interfaces. On the other hand, the new supply patterns are not regulated simply by noncontractual continuing relations and tit-for-tat enforcement –as suggested by the
relational models of Lamoreoux, Raff and Timins.45 Rather, what we see emerging are
organizational networks linked by explicit, formal contracts that rely on collaboration and
co-design to stimulate continuous improvement in product development and engineering.
Because the collaborative process is continuous, the parties operate in an on-going state
of uncertainty, one in which operational decisions must be continually updated and
refined. This phenomenon of continuous uncertain change poses a unique challenge for
contract design.

In this environment, we observe contracts in which parties create elaborate
governance mechanisms in lieu of the more familiar risk-allocation provisions of
conventional contracts.46 The contracts can be arrayed along a continuum, ranging from
contractual relationships that impose no formally enforceable obligations on the parties
but that contemplate on-going relationships of unlimited duration, to collaborative
research agreements that look to the development of a particular product and a
consequent end game. In each case, there is an iterated process of continuous
45

While we are confident that they would include contracting for innovation within their general
framework, as we set out it note __ supra, the hard task is understanding the structures that we
actually observe.
46
The distinction we draw between risk and uncertainty does not imply that the “conventional”
contracts that we distinguish from those we study here are free from uncertainty in Knightian
terms. For example, both “types” of contracts must account for moral hazard and other kinds of
endogenous uncertainty. Rather, the distinction is between those contracts characterized by
continuous uncertainty and those where relevant uncertainties such as product performance are
resolved during the life of the contract.
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collaboration and innovation that functionally substitutes for ex ante specification of the
desired product. In each case, the parties make relation-specific investments in learning
about their collaborator’s capabilities, and these investments erect barriers to either
party’s taking advantage of their mutual dependencies. Thus, even in relationships that
one might traditionally describe as stable, the spill-over effects of continuous innovation
create “coordination cascades”---an innovation by one party that requires coordination
with a second party, whose response then requires adjustment by and further coordination
with the first party.

None of the familiar mechanisms for coping with the problem of contractual
incompleteness adequately responds to the challenge posed by structuring transactions in
the face of continuous uncertainty. But as theory and conventional legal practice have
lagged behind the conditions in the marketplace, transactional lawyers in a number of
industries apparently have begun responding to their clients’ need to structure new
relationships in light of the constraints imposed by uncertainty and have created the novel
patterns of contracting whose characteristics we now address.

A. Elements of Contractual Governance under Continuous Uncertainty
The location of the innovative activity distinguishes the contracts of interest to us
from more traditional relational contracting. In the new arrangements, innovation is the
product of a joint effort by two or more organizations; it is metaphorically situated
between them and is dependent on both. The development of the Boeing 787 aircraft is a
good example. Innovation in the design and manufacture of the wing, the province of
one supplier (or group of suppliers), is dependent on the design and manufacture of the
fuselage, the province of a different supplier (or group of suppliers), and vice versa. 47
Innovation in one structure must mesh with innovation in the other in order for either to
be successful. The wing must not only be compatible with the fuselage; the two must fit.
Innovation is thus a collaborative and iterative process rather than a discrete product

47

For a description of collaborative innovation in the production of commercial aircraft, see Alan
O’ Sullivan, Why Tense, Unstable, and Diverse Relations are Inherent in Co-designing with
Suppliers: An Aerospace Case Study, 15 Indus. & Corp. Change 221 (2006).
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supplied by a party upstream in the supply chain according to specifications set by a
downstream customer. 48

Precisely how have parties to these new collaborative relationships structured
their contracts? We set out to answer this question in two stages. We began our research
for this Article with a small group of twelve contracts, each of which committed the
parties to a collaborative process of design and production. From that initial group we
selected three exemplars, described in detail in Part III, which reflect distinct patterns of
collaborative production and supply. The Deere-Stanadyne contract addresses
collaboration but without any product/sale obligation;49 the Apple-SCI contract couples
collaboration with production for a fixed period, while contemplating joint efforts for a
longer term to which, however, neither party was obligated;50 and the Warner-LambertLigand contract covers the collaborative search for a product and the non-collaborative
commercialization of it.51

As the foregoing suggests, the transactions governed by these contracts share a
number of characteristics. First, the primary output is an innovative “product,”52 one
whose characteristics, costs, and manufacture, because of uncertainty, cannot be specified
ex ante. Second, neither party alone has the capacity to specify and develop the
“product’s” characteristics, costs, and methods of manufacture; hence, there must be
collaboration among companies with different capabilities. Third, the process of
48

Id.

49

The Deere-Stanadyne contract obligates neither party to supply or purchase anything. Instead it
establishes only the terms of future purchases should they occur and established formal programs
covering Deere’s evaluation of a supplier’s characteristics and performance. See TAN supra.
50
The Apple-SCI contract is a turnkey arrangement for production of a substantial fraction of
Apple’s personal computers. The arrangement necessarily involves collaborative, iterative
innovation to coordinate changing technology and demand with changes in the manufacturing and
assembly process but does not bind either party after the first three years. See TAN supra.
51
The Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract concerns a collaborative effort to discover and
commercialize pharmaceutical products over a specified term and specifies the options at the end
of collaboration if the parties’ efforts result in a marketable product. See TAN supra.
52
We use the term “product” in this section to describe a range of innovative outputs: it may
result in a single product, but it also can be a stream of innovations (see e.g., the Apple-SCI, GM
and Deere-Stanadyne contracts discussed infra) or intellectual property that results in a single
patent or patentable things (see, e.g., the Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract discussed infra).
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specification and development will be iterative: Individual design elements will depend
on the recurrent input from those working upstream or downstream and from those
working on other design elements. Thus, central to these transactions are communication
and cooperation across the two (or more) firms---the design, specification and
determination of manufacturing characteristics will be the result of repeated interactive
collaborative efforts by employees of separate firms each with distinct capabilities.

These commonalities highlight the conceptual questions that any explanatory
theory must resolve. How do the parties deal with the problems of opportunism and the
risk of hold-up that seem endemic in such interactive collaborative relationships? In
particular, how do the parties constrain the temptation to exploit for private purposes
information that is developed collaboratively? And, how do the parties divide the
eventual gains from the collaborative relationship when uncertainty precludes specifying
the division ex ante and specific investment makes ex post allocation subject to hold up?
Is this temptation to use jointly-produced information opportunistically and to hold up the
counterparty when dividing gains adequately deterred by the elaborate set of formal and
informal governance mechanisms that are a defining characteristic of these collaborative
contracts?
B. The Technology of Contracts: The Problem of Incompleteness.53
To begin to answer these questions, recall first the principal reasons that
transacting parties seek to write explicit contracts and the limits to such efforts. Explicit
contracts can protect, and thereby encourage, specific investments,54 which are often
critical to transactions that contemplate more than a single simultaneous exchange. Yet
contractual terms that encourage both parties to make efficient ex ante investments in the
subject matter of the contract may undermine the ex post efficiency of the transaction if
completion is compelled whenever one party still benefits, even when circumstances have

53

This discussion draws on Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the
Theory of Contract Design, 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 187 (2005), and Robert E. Scott & George
G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L. J. 814 (2006).
54
See TAN __ supra.
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so changed that the result is a net loss for the parties jointly.55 Thus, the goal of efficient
specific investment ex ante and of efficient ex post trade will often be at loggerheads
when parties contract under uncertainty. The commitment necessary to motivate specific
investments that maximize the contractual surplus will typically conflict with the
flexibility needed to halt transactions (even when one party will still benefit) that have
insufficient net value when uncertainty is resolved.

To see why, consider a benchmark solution to the dual objective of ex ante and ex
post efficiency: a complete, legally enforceable, state-contingent contract. Such a
contract specifies ex ante the parties’ obligations in each possible ex post state of the
world and is enforceable according to its terms, thereby assuring that performance occurs
when, but only when, it is efficient. But while complete state-contingent contracts
theoretically can address the tension between efficient ex ante investment and efficient ex
post performance, the transaction costs of contracting frustrate this happy outcome. Of
particular importance are the information barriers that prevent parties from controlling
moral hazard when the future states of the world depend on their own actions. As a
result, when the level of uncertainty is high, contracts will be incomplete because it
simply costs too much (or may be impossible) for contracting parties to foresee and then
describe appropriately the contractual outcomes for all (or even most) of the possible
future states of the world that might materialize.56

The information costs of contracting are incurred in two stages. Ex ante
contracting costs are those of anticipating contingencies that may affect efficient
performance and therefore efficient investment, and writing a contract that specifies an
outcome for each. Ex post enforcement costs are those of observing and proving any fact
relevant to determining the actual state of the world (given that the parties have an
55

An ex post efficient contract should seek to ensure that exchange proceeds in all circumstances
in which it produces value, but not otherwise. Trade is inefficient when the realized cost of
performance to the promisor turns out to exceed the value of performance to the promise.
56
See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 115 (1999); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
Econometrica 755 (1988); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.
L. Econ. & Org. 119 (1988).
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incentive to misrepresent actuality). It is costly to specify what should happen in
different future states, and it is costly to prove what actually did happen. Both ex ante
and ex post contracting costs prevent parties from writing complete state contingent
contracts.

Facing uncertainty and information costs, how should parties formalize their
contracts? One option is to write an intentionally incomplete contract with precise,
unchanging terms, i.e., determinate outcomes that apply across the board regardless of the
eventual state of the world. For example, Buyer might contract with Seller at a fixed
price for the manufacture of a precisely specified, customized machine, where Seller
promises to deliver and Buyer promise to pay even if subsequent events increase Seller’s
costs or reduce Buyer’s value. Such “hard” terms bind the parties to their respective
commitments, which motivates each party as promisee to undertake relation-specific
investments, and encourages each party as promisor to take cost-effective steps to reduce
anticipated risk-bearing costs.

But because the hard terms of such an intentionally incomplete contract do not
change based on what actually happens, they may be inefficient ex post when the passage
of time replaces uncertainty with fact. As suggested above, the actual cost to Seller of
manufacturing the customized machine precisely as specified in the contract may exceed
its value to Buyer.57 Under those conditions, both parties would prefer to design their
contract ex ante so as to avoid inefficient production ex post.

One solution to the inflexibility of hard terms is for the parties to renegotiate the
contract once uncertainties are resolved. But if parties have made specific investments in
the contract, later renegotiation raises the risk of a hold-up; increased risk of hold-up, in
turn, undermines the incentive to make those investments in the first place.58

57

Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089
(1981).
58
For discussion, see Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98
J. Pol. Econ. 98 (1990); Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The
Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, J. L. Econ & Org. 199 (1988).
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Alternatively, if information costs are high because neither the likelihood nor
character of ex post change can be anticipated, the parties may emphasize ex post rather
than ex ante efficiency in seeking to balance the two. In that case, they could draft a
formal contract with vague standards, i.e., “soft” terms that invite subsequent adjustment
to reflect what actually happened. Thus, for example, Seller might agree to adjust in
good faith the specifications for the customized machine if the cost of providing the
machine as originally specified later proved greater than its value to Buyer. By agreeing
to “good faith adjustment,” the parties seek to ensure that their contract is efficient both
ex ante (by constraining ex post hold-up) and ex post (by providing for a mechanism that
assures that the machine is produced if and only if it is efficient to do so).

But a contract that uses soft terms to address both ex ante uncertainty and the risk
of ex post hold-up raises a moral hazard problem of its own through the actual operation
of the soft terms. Here moral hazard results from a promisor with the discretion to adjust
performance as conditions change always choosing the best alternative for him, rather
than the “good faith” adjustment required by the soft terms, even though the selfinterested choice is unlikely to be best for the promisee or to maximize the parties’ joint
welfare.59 Nor can the moral hazard problem necessarily be solved by delegating
authority to determine the proper adjustment to a court. Soft terms such as “good faith
adjustment” remain as intractably ambiguous to judges as to the parties themselves,
especially since the latter can act in bad faith in establishing the facts and in persuading
the former what good faith should entail. Given, therefore, that a judge or other third
party verifying contract performance under a broad standard of good faith adjustment
may mistakenly permit the promisor to substitute a lower cost proxy for the agreed
performance (say, by tendering an inferior machine), the promisor will be tempted to do
so, even when this reduces joint welfare.

In short, neither “hard” nor “soft” contract terms can, standing alone, solve the
problem of incomplete contracts. Under conditions of uncertainty, therefore, parties
59

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale
L.J. 541, 601-05 (2003).

25

predictably seek to optimize total contracting costs by trading off the respective benefits
and costs of commitment and flexibility. They can do this by shifting costs between the
front and back end—the two stages--of the contracting process. As the preceding
discussion illustrates, a core feature of contract design is the allocation of resources
between drafting and enforcement. When the parties agree, for instance, to use their best
efforts or to behave in a commercially reasonable manner, the subsequent adjudication of
contractual disputes concerning their efforts or behavior requires a court to give precise
meaning to those vague phrases. Thus, by using soft terms, parties delegate the
specification of performance requirements to a court at the back end of the contracting
process. The parties must bear the expected costs of litigation (including the costs of
moral hazard in its conduct). But because a court has the benefit of some information
unavailable to the parties at the time of formation, adjudication potentially allows them to
benefit from more efficient performance standards than they could have specified ex ante.

Alternatively, when the parties agree to precise or “hard” terms, such as the
obligation to supply a precisely specified, customized machine at a fixed price, they
withdraw authority from courts to determine their particular performance obligations and
direct instead enforcement of the obligations specified in advance. As noted above, this
strategy requires the parties to fix performance obligations that rely on mere estimates of
the likelihood of various future events rather than the actual occurrence of those events
that is available to a court at a later date. The parties thus tradeoff between the benefits
of ex ante precision (with resulting ex post inefficiency) against the hindsight advantage
of the court in later litigation tempered by the moral hazard costs inherent in the process.
C. Contracting Under Continuous Uncertainty: The Limits of Contract Theory.
The preceding discussion highlights the problem that contracting for collaborative
innovation must confront. The transactional structure must provide mechanisms for the
sharing of information between the parties. In particular, the parties need credible
information about each other’s technical capacity, ability to manage a collaborative effort
and capability for cooperative interaction, and especially each party’s capacity to deal
productively with disagreements that necessarily will arise when the characteristics of the
desired innovation cannot be specified in advance. Moreover, this sharing of information
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is a continuous, collaborative process, one that requires asymmetric investments by each
party as the collaboration proceeds along the critical path. The contract design problem
is acute, however, because the collaborative process generates continuous uncertainty.
As a result, the parties cannot simply agree on the optimal trade off between ex ante and
ex post informational advantages. There is no ex post period in which hindsight can be
used to optimize a contractual relationship; the parties are continually cycling between
different combinations of ex ante and ex post states. The crucial question thus becomes
whether one’s counterparty acts opportunistically; that is, takes advantage of the
collaborative process to capture a larger share of the jointly created surplus (say, by using
jointly produced information for its private benefit).60 And the key challenge for
transactional design is correspondingly to support the cooperative effort by constraining
the strategic behavior made possible by ex ante specific investments in the collaborative
project.

As discussed above, “renegotiation” of the contract ex post can, in theory, assure
both ex ante and ex post efficiency in the face of uncertainty. Once the uncertainty is
resolved, parties can in effect write a new contract specifying the decision the party in
control should take---to perform, to alter the terms of performance, or to abandon the
transaction, or whether to make a side payment. This renegotiation can achieve ex post
efficiency through Coasian bargaining: If a contract remains profitable to the promisor
and yet is inefficient, the promisee will “bribe” the promisor not to perform.

As we have seen, however, renegotiation addresses only half the problem. It
creates the flexibility to achieve ex post efficiency. But the prospect of renegotiation
itself creates the possibility of hold-ups, which in turn undermines ex ante efficient
60

See e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Emisphere Technologies, Inc, 408 F. Supp. 2d 668 (2006) (
Emisphere entitled to terminate contract for collaborative research where Lilly created a secret
research team that used the jointly produced information for purposes outside the collaboration);
In the matter of the Arbitration between Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Elan Pharmaceuticals, 781
N. Y.S. 2d 95 (2004) (contractual relationship breaks down when Pfizer acquired Pharmacia and
allegedly used information transferred to the collaboration to support a “separate research
program.”); Static Control Components v. Mitsubishi Kagaku Imaging Corp., 2007 WL 586710
(M.D. N.C.) (plaintiff claims defendant breached confidentiality provision by selling codeveloped products to third parties, and favored other competitors over plaintiff).
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investment. Contract and property-rights theorists have proposed solutions to the hold-up
problem that rely on regulating renegotiation so as to constrain the eventual sharing of the
surplus. For example, property rights theorists propose favoring the “efficient” owner:
the one whose human capital is most complementary to the physical assets deployed in
the project, and whose propensity to invest in those assets is therefore most sensitive to
the assurance of continuing control of them. Contract theorists, in turn, have proposed
several alternative mechanisms to increase one party’s bargaining power in the future
negotiations, for example by allocating that party the rights to control key decisions or
property rights in assets specific to the exchange.61 From these perspectives, a contract
sets the field for future renegotiation of the terms of exchange after uncertainty has been
resolved.

But efforts to constrain hold-ups by ex ante assignment of ex post decision rights
fail for the contracts that concern us here. If there is no clear separation between the ex
ante contract that supports transaction-specific investment and the resolution of
uncertainty ex post, the identity of the party to whom decision or property rights should
be allocated will continually shift, if it can be detected at all. Assignment of decision
rights to this ephemeral owner will thus be meaningless. The discussion in Part I
describes a new pattern of collaborative innovation in the supply chain, one characterized
by multiple information flows, iterative design and adaptation, all between separate firms.
This network production responds to a technological and commercial environment where
change is constant; adaptation must take place quickly and continuously; and the
technology necessary to produce a cutting edge product is not found in a single firm. The
parties are not contracting over a temporary state whose resolution can be anticipated
with enough precision to choose the efficient structure of post-resolution negotiation.62
61

Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986) (property ownership rights used to
determine the parties’ bargaining position in ex post renegotiation); Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Property “Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1990) (same).
62
The renegotiation models that theorists have developed have the following key assumptions:
parties’ efforts (i.e., investment decisions) are non-contractible ex ante, but after uncertainty is
resolved efforts are contractible ex post. That means that ex post there will be a renegotiation and
(following Coase) the parties will allocate decision rights efficiently. The theorists answer to the
ex post hold-up problem is to allocate decision rights and control ex ante so as to give the
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Rather they are contracting over the creation of something whose features—and the
complementarities between those features and their own (changing) interests—emerges
only through many iterations between them. When it is unclear at the time of the
formation how large the contractual investments should be, and which party should make
them and how gains should be shared, it is plainly impossible to mitigate the risk of ex
post strategic behavior by regulating renegotiation in the familiar ways.63

In response to these limitations, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy have developed a
model that realistically assumes that decision rights often are not contractible ex post, so
that neither renegotiation to the efficient outcome nor the allocation of decision rights
through options is possible. In this environment, the formal contract dictates a
governance structure that motivates self-enforcing informal adjustments.64 The optimal
governance structure is achieved in this model by the ex ante contractual allocation—
often in the form of an option—of ex post decision rights to the party who, because of
informal constraints, has the least incentive to behave opportunistically. As one of us put
it sometime ago, “the goal is to shift the discretion to the party whose misuse of it can be
most easily constrained,”65 rather than to specify the appropriate adjustment. For
example, in venture capital contracting, the decision whether to continue a project is

bargaining power in the ex post renegotiation to the investing party. See sources cited in note 57
infra
63
The problem faced by parties to collaborative contracting is similar to the problem faced by
parties to preliminary agreements: they also function in a complex environment in which a
profitable project can take a number of forms and just what form will work, if any, is unknown at
the start. In the preliminary agreement context, simultaneous investments by both parties makes a
project sufficiently tangible to support a complete contract. But during the investment period,
there is a perverse incentive to behave opportunistically by delaying a promised investment.
Contemporary law can best solve this problem by characterizing that defection as a breach and
protecting the promisee’s reliance expenditures. Alan Schwartz & Robert E.. Scott,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 685-91 (2007).
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George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Contracting for Control (mimeo 2006),
available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/Contracts+Conf+-+April+7-8,+2006+-+Paper++Gibbons?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=961193&showthumb=0 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American
Experience, 55 Stan. L Rev. 1067, 1081 (2003)
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shifted to the venture capitalist through staged financing because its decision, unlike that
of the entrepreneur, is policed by an effective reputation market.66

But while ex ante assignment of ex post decision rights via an option can address
the governance problem where the option holder is constrained by informal mechanisms
(as well as by contractually determined “prices”), an option approach has important
limits. When the parties must adapt continuously, uncertainty about which party’s
opportunism needs to be constrained, and a consequent inability to predict the decisions
that actually will have to be made, imply that options are not a feasible technique for
assuring efficient adaptation.67 This setting, which describes the transactional
environment in many of the new collaborative arrangements, requires instead a formal
governance mechanism that stimulates the development of stable cooperative equilibria
to support informal, relational contracting.

In Part IV, we show that these insights offers valuable tools for explaining the
contractual patterns that we observe in a small number of co-design contracts. Before
doing so, we turn in Part III to a more detailed description of three contracts for
innovation that guide our analysis.

III. THREE CONTRACT EXEMPLARS

Our development of a theory of contractual collaboration and co-design in Part IV
uses three real life transactional exemplars. The contracts were chosen to illustrate a
continuum of circumstances involving collaborative innovation across organizational
boundaries. Despite variations owing to the particular transaction, our exemplars
demonstrate surprising consistency of core features across industry settings. One (the
66

Id. at 1086.
Baker et. al. solve part of this problem by assuming that there is no transaction-specific
investment, which eliminates the ex ante-ex post tension. As we will see, collaborative
innovation does require specific investment, though of a different kind than usually assumed in
the contract theory literature and, we think, in the circumstances that Baker et. al. actually have in
mind. Our analysis here generalizes the Baker et. al. approach to encompass the type of
transaction specific investment inherent in collaborative innovation settings.
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Deere-Stanadyne contract) helps establish and maintain a long-term supply arrangement
but does not obligate either party to supply or to purchase anything; the parties perform
under the contract without any formally enforceable obligations. A second contract (the
Apple-SCI contract) involves two clearly specified and legally enforceable obligations –
to buy a manufacturing plant from the seller of a product and to continue to manufacture
and supply that product for a specified term – and two unspecified and legally
unenforceable obligations: to collaborate on continual improvements in the product and
to supply it beyond the specified term. The third (the Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract)
involves collaboration in the creation of a single class of pharmaceutical products, which
would then be guided through the process of regulatory approval and commercialized by
only one of the parties.68

We use the analysis of these three contracts to develop in Part IV a working
theory (or extended hypothesis) to explain the contractual governance mechanisms we
observe. In subsequent work, we will test our theoretical predictions against a larger
group of contracts that support collaborative innovation. We stress that we use these
three contracts principally as exemplars in developing our theory; we simply do not know
yet the extent to which they generalize to other collaborative ventures. What we do know
is that the key features of the contracts we highlight are not captured by the literature that
we have discussed above. If contract is substituting for organization in the vertical
disintegration of the supply chain, current contract theory does not explain the resulting
arrangement.

A final point of caution about generalizing from a very small number of the real
contracts: We have no reason to believe that individual lawyers and clients negotiating
68

The contracts were obtained from one of two sources of contracts available on the internet:
onecle.com, http://www.onecle.com, and the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute,
http://cori.missour.edu. These organizations, in turn, obtain most of their contracts from SEC
filings on the Edgar database. Firms with a class of security registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 are required to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission copies
of their material contracts as exhibits to their periodic reports. These exhibits are accessible over
the internet through the SEC’s EDGAR database. It is commonplace for certain provisions in a
contract to be redacted prior to being added to the public data base pursuant to a company’s
request for confidentiality.
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and writing individual contracts will craft the efficient structure every time – even in
competitive markets efficiency constraints are simply not that binding.69 Each contract
will contain singularities; some may include mistakes. Mindful of this, we examine only
central or exemplary features in the documents, and we connect these to suggest how,
taken together, they respond to the contracting problem under discussion. Put differently,
the aim is to stylize what appear to us to be the parties’ intuitions and experience about
what works, so that we can later assemble a larger group of contracts to assess whether
we have correctly identified the mechanisms underpinning their success.

A. The Deere-Stanadyne Contract.
The Deere-Stanadyne agreement covers two very different functions – the supply
and purchase of parts for Deere’s existing products, and the collaborative process of
developing new products as technology and the market for Deere’s products evolve. The
bulk of the formal contract concerns parts for Deere’s current products. What is in many
ways the commercially most important part of the arrangement, however, concerns as yet
unidentified future products and is established by indirection rather than by explicit
provisions.

Deere manufactures and sells machinery and equipment used in agriculture,
construction, and commercial-residential lawn-garden care. Stanadyne owns and
operates design and manufacturing facilities for precision engine components including
injection equipment.70 Most of the agreement addresses Stanadyne’s provision of parts
listed in an Appendix to the agreement (that was not available to us); other parts could be
added by mutual written consent. Since Deere’s product line would change over the five
years, it was inevitable that its parts requirements would change as well. The new parts
would be co-developed by the parties, although the contract says nothing of that.
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The contract terms meet only the weakest test of “birth,” not the stronger test of “survival.”
See Victor P. Goldberg & John R. Erickson, Quality and Price Adjustment in Long-Term
Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J, L. & Econ. 369, 371 (1987).
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Interestingly, the bulk of the formal contract, while focusing on the provision of
specified parts for Deere’s existing products, is not legally enforceable because it did not
actually require the parties do anything; although the contract does refer to anticipated
levels of Deere purchases, Stanadyne did not have to produce any parts and if it did
produce them, Deere was under no obligation to take them (unless Deere issued a
purchase order). The parties could easily have written a plainly enforceable supply
contract. The parsimonious conclusion is that they chose to avoid legally enforceable
commitments, not that they were creating an opportunity to convince a court to disregard
the contract’s language. Conversely, there is no question that orders actually placed by
Deere were enforceable at specified prices and subject to a sharing arrangement for cost
savings achieved with respect to designated products.71

This brings us to the matter of central concern. A substantial fraction of the parts
specified in 2001 would be supplanted during the five year life of the contract and
thereafter.72 The written agreement gives Stanadyne very little comfort with regard to
new parts. Stanadyne can coordinate with Deere in devising the parts and controlling
their costs. However, the agreement explicitly disavows any obligation on the part of
Deere to develop parts with or purchase parts from Stanadyne. Deere’s only obligation is
to negotiate in good faith, and that obligation is limited by a broad meeting competition
clause that gives Deere virtually complete discretion.73
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Article VIII (B) provides that “ If STANADYNE CORPORATION is in compliance with Section V [the
Achieving Excellence program described below], all SD Program reductions realized will be shared equally
between DEERE and STANADYNE CORPORATION. If DEERE determines that STANADYNE
CORPORATION is not globally competitive and therefore not in compliance with Section V, however,
STANADYNE CORPORATION agrees to pass 100% of cost reductions realized to DEERE until such
time as they are in compliance.”
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The agreement was follow-on to a previous five-year contract that was extended for an
additional five years.
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Article VIII (B) provides that “ If STANADYNE CORPORATION is in compliance with Section V [the
Achieving Excellence program described below], all SD Program reductions realized will be shared equally
between DEERE and STANADYNE CORPORATION. If DEERE determines that STANADYNE
CORPORATION is not globally competitive and therefore not in compliance with Section V, however,
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The written agreement, therefore, does not commit either party with respect to the
development of new products within the existing five year term or thereafter. Yet, the
success of the supply relationship and of both parties’ businesses depends on continued
innovations in Deere’s products and therefore in the parts produced by Stanadyne. And
precisely because the parties could not specify what innovations would be necessary or
feasible, or could be produced at a cost effective price, something other than a state
contingent contract had to govern the parties’ ongoing response to uncertainty.

From this perspective, the more significant element of the arrangement is a Deere
program for supplier relationships---Achieving Excellence---that is identified but not
explained in the contract.74 The Achieving Excellence program, established in 1991, has
three interrelated components: (a) measuring and monitoring performance; (b) providing
and transmitting information about the character of the parties; and (c) combining (a) and
(b) as the parties learn about both product development and each other over time.

The Deere Achieving Excellence program sets up a hierarchy of suppliers,
ranging from conditional at the bottom to Partner at the top. A Partner is defined as a
“supplier who exceeds our performance standards, has reached world-class levels, and
has a high impact on the satisfaction level of our customers.”75 If a supplier maintains
Partner status five years in a row, it goes into the Deere Hall of Fame. In 2006, for
example, twenty-one suppliers achieved Hall of Fame status.76 Suppliers are judged in
five categories: quality, delivery, technical support, cost management, and wavelength.
The first four are self-explanatory. The last, wavelength, purports to capture the
supplier’s ability to manage the human underpinnings of collaboration with Deere. It is a
composite of initiative, attitude, responsiveness, attention to detail, communication, and
safety performance.77 Under the program, the suppliers’ performance is evaluated on a
74

The supplier agrees only to participate (but given the absence of any consequences, the
commitment is not enforceable): “STANADYNE CORPORATION will strive to meet or exceed
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status.” Article V.
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semi-annual basis by Deere evaluation teams whose composition---including
representatives from all plants supplied and various corporate functions---reflects and
balances Deere’s different interests in its supply base, and thus helps protect both supplier
and customer against partial judgments.

This arrangement suggests why the legal non-enforceability of the agreement is of
little importance to the parties. External verification of the facts surrounding a supplier’s
collaboration with Deere in developing new products through the legal process would be
extremely difficult. Whether, for example, the supplier acted in good faith in refusing or
failing to develop and produce a specific product is difficult for a court to determine,
especially because, for reasons discussed above, both parties are prone to opportunistic
behavior during judicial fact finding. In contrast, Deere’s Achieving Excellence program
is a governance mechanism that allows Deere to act based only on what its own
evaluation teams find to be observable, rather than also having to verify those findings to
a court. Moreover, the “wavelength” category puts suppliers on notice that Deere will
take into account a supplier’s character, in particular a supplier’s attitudes toward
cooperation.

Assessment of a supplier’s capabilities and character is based on the actual
experience of collaboration. It therefore takes time: As a supplier moves from
conditional supplier to Partner, both Deere and Stanadyne learn more each other’s
capabilities and character. Thus, replacing a particular supplier means that Deere would
have to incur the costs of learning both the capabilities and character of a new one;
making an existing relationship work is often preferable to incurring the information
costs associated with a replacement.

The same kind of considerations will constrain the supplier. Losing Deere as a
customer eliminates the value of Stanadyne’s investment in teaching Deere about its
capabilities and character. Moreover, the loss increases the investment a new customer
would have to make in a relationship with Stanadyne, as the potential customer would
want to understand why Deere had terminated the supplier. This problem has a
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symmetric impact on Deere. Suppliers have to learn that Deere has the capabilities and
character necessary to warrant the supplier’s investment (i.e., that the Achieving
Excellence program remains credible). Deere’s failure to manage effectively a prior
supply relationship raises questions that a new supplier would have to invest in
answering.78

Finally, either party’s termination of the relationship potentially results in a
depreciation of the other party’s reputation. Precisely because a party’s actual
performance is neither observable nor verifiable by potential customers, a breakdown in
the relationship imposes costs beyond the immediate loss of Deere’s business or the
supplier’s product.

Consistent with the parties’ needs to demonstrate their trustworthiness and to
allow each to learn how the other responds to disagreements (a characteristic critical to
ongoing collaborative innovation), the agreement established a two-step dispute
resolution process. First, executives from each firm higher up in the management than
the disputing managers would meet in good faith in an attempt to negotiate a resolution.79
If that failed, the dispute would go to arbitrators using Illinois law and the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.

Thus, in the contracts between Deere and its suppliers, the nature of the parts to
be produced and the technology for producing them changes over the course of the
agreement in response to changes in the marketplace. Deere’s products and the parts
provided by suppliers co-evolve as the interplay between Deere and its suppliers
produces new information. Deere and its suppliers relied upon an external, pre-existing,
78
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Article XXII (G) (1) The parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve any controversy, claim or
dispute of whatever nature arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination,
enforceability or validity thereof (a "DISPUTE") promptly by negotiation between executives or
managers who have authority to settle the DISPUTE, and who are at a higher level of
management than the persons who have direct responsibility for the administration of this
Agreement.
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informal governance mechanism over the course of their relationship to govern the
innovative portion of the supply relationship, and an explicit, legally enforceable contract
to govern the actual provision of specific parts.

B. Apple-SCI Manufacturing Agreement
The Apple-SCI agreement represents a movement in the direction of legal
enforceability compared to the Deere-Stanadyne agreement. Because the Apple-SCI
agreement appears to cover two conceptually separate but related transactions---a one
time sale of a manufacturing facility and an ongoing commitment to collaborative
innovation in connection with the manufacture and assembly of Apple computers---we
see two different approaches to dealing with the challenge of dividing gains. The
agreement has quite explicit enforceable contract terms to support the one time sale, but
the commitment to collaborative innovation is protected by implicit, unenforceable terms.

In 1996, Apple sold its Fountain Colorado manufacturing plant to SCI and
simultaneously entered into a three-year contract to purchase a substantial share of its
logic boards and personal computers from that plant. The transactions were one element
in Apple’s strategic decision to rely more on outsourcing. SCI was at the time the largest
“contract manufacturer,” with sales of around $4 billion, twenty plants in eight countries,
over 15,000 employees, and over fifty customers, including Hewlett Packard and IBM.80

The contract itself is fairly straightforward. For an initial three year term, Apple
promised to purchase at least a specified percentage of its logic boards and computers
from SCI. Rather than committing to purchase a specific number of units, Apple’s
commitment was a function of its total purchases; that is, it agreed to buy a specified
fraction of its main logic boards and computer systems in each of the three years. For the
former the commitment for the three years was 60/50/40; for the latter it was 40/40/30.
While the contract could be extended on a year-by-year basis, Apple made no purchase
commitment after year three.
80
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2000).
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The sale was said to have been triggered by Apple’s inability to meet a surge in
demand from its own plants.81 The terms of the contract seem to have given Apple
significant flexibility.82 The formulation of its purchase obligation in relative terms
shifted the risk of demand fluctuation to SCI.83 To some extent, this flexibility stands the
traditional logic of industrial organization on its head, since we would normally expect to
see a greater likelihood of vertical integration by ownership when the possibility of
shortages would make the firm subject to the threat of hold-up. In the case of the contract
manufacturing sector, however, the ability to respond quickly to demand fluctuations – to
bear the risk of either over or under capacity---is central to the package that is offered to
customers. Thus, to the extent that explicit legal remedies are insufficient to constrain an
SCI holdup in the first three years, and with respect to any supply beginning in year four,
the risk of hold up must be constrained by something other than explicit contract.84

For at least the three-year initial term, the explicit portion of the Apple-SCI
contract looks like a straightforward supply agreement, albeit with a formulation that
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Timothy J. Sturgeon, Turnkey Production Network: A New American Model of Industrial
Organization?, Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy Working Paper BRIEWP92A
(1997), available at https://repositories.elib.org/brie/ BRIEWP92A.
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Within the constraints of the percentage volume commitment, Apple had considerable
flexibility to respond to market conditions. Apple provides on a monthly basis non-binding
forecasts covering the following six months and issues monthly Purchase orders on a rolling four
month basis. Apple could increase or decrease the quantity without penalty if it gave satisfactory
advance notice. If Apple required greater flexibility, then it would be responsible for any
overtime charges and vendor premiums. Apple could cancel any purchase order with 30 days
notice provided that it reimburses SCI for costs reasonably incurred. Additionally, the percentage
volume commitment itself provided flexibility to Apple to respond to market movements through
a make up clause; if Apple fell below its commitment in the first two years; it could either add the
shortfall to its commitment for the third year or pay SCI the profit it would have earned on the
shortfall.
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Because Apple committed only to a specified share of its purchases, SCI bore the risk that
reduced demand (for Apple computers or industry wide) would result in an absolute decline in
Apple’s purchases from SCI, while increased demand would commit SCI to provide additional
product, even though in both cases SCI’s share of Apple’s purchases would not change.
84
As discussed TAN __ infra, Apple has multiple sources for the products it is purchasing from
SCI; that is, Apple will be getting 60 percent of its computers from suppliers other than SCI.
Multi-sourcing provides some protection against SCI specific opportunism, but when hold-up is
made possible by industry wide short supply there is no reason not to expect other suppliers to
behave just as would SCI.
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shifts much of the risk of demand fluctuation to the contract manufacturer. This element
of the agreement seems to protect SCI’s purchase of the manufacturing plant from Apple:
For the first three years, Apple will provide sufficient volume to make the plant
acquisition viable. For our purposes, however, the more interesting part of the contract is
a second set of obligations concerning co-design of the actual products to be supplied.

Technological change in the computer industry is rapid and, as noted, the contract
is for products not yet known; Apple commits to purchase circuit boards and personal
computers, but the specifications for those products are not set out in the contract. Thus,
Apple and SCI had to collaborate in defining the performance characteristics of the
products to be manufactured by SCI, and in setting the price to be paid.

From this perspective, the centerpiece of the contract was the parties’ agreement
to establish “product plans.”85 SCI promised to produce, and Apple promised to purchase,
something over the three-year term, but the details would be determined collaboratively
over the performance period. Apple would provide the first product plan, less than a
month into the agreement. Since the first plan likely would largely reflect Apple’s
existing specifications, little collaboration was necessary. In contrast, subsequent plans,
which would have to both anticipate and respond to technology changes, would be
prepared collaboratively. In addition to providing a pricing formula for the products, the
plans would specify pre-production services including development of assembly and test
processes; development of test programs and/or fixtures; and production of prototype
and/or validation units. The plan would also include a pre-production delivery and
payment schedule. SCI would appoint a test engineer to work with Apple’s test
engineers and, if necessary, co-locate that engineer at Apple’s facilities. SCI would
regularly report to Apple and make its facilities available to Apple for inspection on
reasonable notice. After a successful pre-production review, Apple would give SCI the
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Article 4.
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go-ahead to begin production.86 SCI would then produce on a “turnkey” basis in
accordance with Apple’s specifications and quality requirements.87

The process is not necessarily completed when Apple approves the specifications.
Once production has begun, one or the other party might find a possible improvement. If
SCI wants to change a component, material, or process it must obtain Apple’s written
consent. Its request must include cost, scheduling, or other impacts of the change and
Apple could require sample units. Adoption of the change would be solely at Apple’s
discretion. If Apple desired a modification in the design, it would have to submit an
“engineering change order;” within a week SCI would have to advise Apple on the cost
or other impacts of the change; again, adoption of the change would be solely at Apple’s
discretion.

The details on pricing are in an exhibit not included with the contract.
Nonetheless, the basic outlines are clear. For each new product SCI would propose a
price quote; the formula would take into account a number of cost factors, but the basic
agreement does not say how these would be weighted. On procured material, SCI would
pass through any cost reductions including rebates and discounts. Failure to do so would
constitute a material breach and would be grounds for immediate termination, except if
the failures were de minimis or accidental and were promptly remedied, with interest.
While such a response would appear at first to be overkill, SCI’s behavior on this
verifiable fact could be a plausible proxy for SCI’s commitment not to behave
opportunistically.88 Importantly, the pricing provisions can function as no more than a
86
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During the three year term the contract also contains three significant explicit remedies
covering situations that presented a serious risk to Apple, and which could arise before switching
costs had risen sufficiently to discourage opportunistic behavior. First, the pricing is subject to a
significant condition regarding quality: “This Agreement and the Pricing Schedules are based on
the assumption that SCI can produce the Products at quality levels suitable for shipment directly
to Apple's distribution system. SCI's inability to achieve certification status as defined in Exhibit
E, will create a significant increase in costs to Apple. SCI will develop a plan to meet such
requirements and understands that failure to achieve certification status within a reasonable time
frame may result in disqualification as an approved Apple supplier.” While the consequences of
a failure to achieve certification or the loss of the approved supplier label are not spelled out, they
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focal point for bargaining, since they are of significance only after an agreement is
reached over the product plan. Thus, the collaboration that leads up to determining the
innovations that will be incorporated in the project allows hard bargaining over pricing
despite the contractual pricing formula.

Thus, at the core of the Apple-SCI agreement is a process of collaborative codesign, in which the parties would iteratively determine the feasibility of innovations
suggested by both parties. For this purpose, the three-year term during which Apple
committed to purchase from SCI in order to support the sale of the manufacturing facility
serves to facilitate the development of valuable information: Joint development of
cumulative changes in product plans over the three year period would generate ever
increasing knowledge about each party’s capacity for collaborative innovation and good
faith dispute resolution, as the products actually being produced reflected less and less of
the legacy of Apple’s pre-contract products and more and more the product of the
collaborative effort. At the end of the three year commitment, the contract no longer
bound either party; it left the parties free to go forward, unconstrained by the detailed
terms of the contract.

The Apple-SCI contract differs from the Deere-Stanadyne contract in that both
Apple and SCI understand that Apple will have other suppliers providing precisely the
products that SCI is providing. Thus, building an informal enforcement mechanism is
more difficult: the costs of finding and learning about replacement suppliers are lower
because Apple already has this information about its parallel suppliers.

From this perspective, we have to distinguish between manufacturing on the one
hand, and collaborative innovation on the other. To the extent that a manufacturer is only
a specifications taker---that is, it manufactures to the specifications Apple develops with
appear to be serious, presumably relieving Apple of future purchase obligations. Second, the
collaborative process will give SCI information about Apple’s future plans, information that
might be valuable to Apple’s competitors. The contractual response to SCI misbehavior
concerning Apple’s competitively sensitive data is draconian: “Apple may terminate this
Agreement effective immediately upon written notice to SCI if SCI materially breaches its
obligation of confidentiality.”
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its collaborative manufacturers---multiple suppliers pose a risk that Apple will switch
from one non-collaborative supplier to others.. To the collaborative manufacturers, in
contrast, the fact of multiple suppliers may not create the same risk. Apple needs to learn
about a new supplier’s capacity to make a contribution. To be sure, they can switch
production to one of their other suppliers, but there are two frictions. First, some of the
suppliers may be just manufacturers and not good at iterative collaboration. Switching
more production to them without finding another supplier who can contribute to
innovation leaves Apple worse off. Alternatively, suppose all suppliers help innovate but
come up with different insights, the best of which Apple builds into the specifications for
all manufacturers. Then Apple is choosing how many suppliers to have; a reduction in
the optimum number of collaborative innovators is a cost to Apple of cheating.

C. Warner-Lambert - Ligand Agreement
The development of new drugs based on biotechnology often entails contracting
across organizational boundaries.89 Large pharmaceutical companies frequently lack the
depth of scientific knowledge and experience that provide the foundation for biotech
research. Smaller biotech firms typically lack the experience and capital both to take the
drugs through the arduous process of obtaining FDA approval and then to commercially
market the drug.90 We observe a broad range of collaborative arrangements including
joint ventures, licensing agreements, and co-development deals.91 We focus here on a
particular contract: a research, development, and license agreement between WarnerLambert, a large pharmaceutical company, and Ligand Pharmaceutical, a much smaller
biotech company, to discover and/or design small-molecule compounds which act
through the estrogen receptors, to develop pharmaceutical products from such
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For example, Robinson and Stuart report that some 25 percent of the $25 billion of industrial
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compounds and to take such products through the FDA approval process and
commercialization (the “Warner-Lambert-Ligand agreement”).92

A brief description of the drug development process provides a context for the
Warner-Lambert-Ligand agreement.93 The initial screening of compounds and
preclinical work take on average three to six years. During that period the number of
compounds under consideration is winnowed from 5,000-10,000 down to a quite small
number through scientific and animal testing. At that point an application for an
Investigational New Drug is filed with the FDA. If the FDA approves, the products can
move to clinical testing of the drug on humans. Clinical testing takes another six to seven
years. That period is broken down into three phases: Phase one tests include less than
100 persons, phase two between 100 and 500, and phase three between 1,000 and 5,000.
If the drug surmounts these hurdles, the sponsoring company submits a New Drug
Application (NDA) with supporting documentation. FDA review of the NDA could take
another six months to two years. If the FDA approves, the drug can be brought to
market. Estimates are that out of 5,000 to 10,000 compounds, only 250 enter preclinical
testing,94 and only about 20 percent of drugs that begin phase one testing are ultimately
approved by the FDA.95 Only upon approval does the pharmaceutical company discover
whether the drug will be successful commercially.

In the research stage of the project, Ligand engages in directed research, with
Warner-Lambert providing the bulk of the funding. In this phase, Warner-Lambert
monitors the work and has options to abandon in the event that the research proves
unpromising. If the project ultimately succeeds, only a small fraction of the costs would
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We will also draw upon Ligand’s contract of May 19, 2000 with Bristol-Myers Squibb to
discover small molecule compounds which act as modulators of the mineralocortoid receptor.
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Because of the regulatory structure, the components of the process are standardized. The
description of the process of developing a new drug is based on “Drug Discovery and
Development” by innovation.org,
http://www.innovation.org/drug_discovery/objects/pdf/RD_Brochure.pdf.
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DiMasi et. al., Cost of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 J. Health Econ. 107, __
(1990).
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DiMasi et. al, The Price of Innovation: New Evidence of Drug Development Costs, 22 J.
Health Econ. 1541, __ (2003).
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be associated with the research phase. The major costs of bringing a drug to market are
in the later stages in which the manufacturer must prove efficacy and safety through
clinical studies in the FDA approval process.96 Once a successful compound has been
identified, Ligand’s role is largely over and, as a result, its role in decision-making
largely disappears. Most decisions in this phase are at the “sole discretion” of WarnerLambert.97

The research stage is divided into three periods with Warner-Lambert having an
option to abandon in the first two. The Exploratory phase is fifteen months; the project
would terminate unless Warner-Lambert gives at least one month’s written notice of its
intention to enter into the second phase, the Extension term. The Extension term
terminates after three years. Funding levels for both periods are specified in dollars per
FTE.98

During the research stage, the parties’ collaboration is centered on a Joint
Research Committee (JRC), an elaborate governance structure responsible for reviewing
96

A growing literature concerning strategic alliances emphasizes three different elements: 1) the
role of strategic alliances as an alternative financing vehicle to venture capital; 2) the role of
networks in developing reputations that help support strategic alliances, and 3) the choice of a
strategic alliance through which to carry on an activity as opposed to undertaking the activity
within the existing entity. See, e.g., Robinson & Stuart, supra note __; David T. Robinson &
Toby E. Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances, 23 J. L. Econ. & Org.
242 (2006); David T. Robinson, Strategic Alliances and the Boundaries of the Firm, 21 Rev. Fin.
Stud. 649 (2008). The three categories, however, share one common characteristic: In their
analysis of the terms of strategic alliances, the need to support the collaborative innovation that is
at the heart of the substantive transaction is typically ignored.
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In addition, Warner-Lambert contemporaneously purchased approximately seven percent of
Ligand’s equity. Thus, the contract contained two linked but distinct agreements, one covering
research and development of small molecule compounds which act through the estrogen
receptors, and another covering the financing of the sale of equity in one research partner to other.
Such equity investments are not uncommon in research and development joint ventures.
Robinson & Stuart, supra note __.
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Article 2.8. FTE (Full-time equivalent) is defined in Article 1 as “one or more researchers with
appropriate qualifications employed by Ligand or Warner-Lambert and assigned to work on the
Collaboration with such time and effort to constitute one such researcher working on the
Collaboration on a full time basis for no less than *** hours per year.” Warner-Lambert then has
the right to add further extension terms. To trigger those extensions, Warner-Lambert has to
provide written notice and a financial commitment to support a certain level of activity.
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and directing all scientific activities in the pre-clinical period. In effect, the JRC
determines the research path. The committee would consist of three members from each
firm; all decisions must be unanimous.99 In the event of a disagreement, the dispute
would go to Ligand’s CEO and the president of Warner-Lambert’s Pharmaceutical
Research Division for “good faith resolution” within a specified period. If they failed to
resolve the dispute, the parties would be free to pursue legal remedies. As with the other
agreements we discuss, the threat to line managers of having to explain to senior
executives of both companies the failure to effectively cooperate likely carried more
weight than the threat of legal action.

In contrast to the JRC collaborative governance structures, Warner-Lambert’s
options to abandon the project are unilateral. If the science proved unpromising it can
terminate with little or no direct cost. There is an indirect cost, however, in that it agrees
not to pursue research in the Field for a specified period. If Warner-Lambert terminates
after the Extension period, the likelihood that something valuable has been produced in
the interim would have increased, and the termination might be opportunistic. The
contract reflects that concern. If Warner-Lambert were to conduct independent research
on a collaborative compound in the field and file an IND within a defined period after
termination, it would have to pay royalties.100

As the project moves from the research to the development stage, regulatory and
market experience becomes more important. The cost of the project, all of which will be
borne by Warner-Lambert, also increases exponentially. As a result, both responsibility
99

Article 3.1.4
The termination provisions in the contract are quite complicated. Warner-Lambert, as noted in
the text, has the option to abandon twice during the research term, at the end of the Exploratory
and Extension terms. In both instances, the background technology would be returned. If
Warner-Lambert terminates after the Exploratory term, it would grant Ligand an exclusive
royalty-free license to use a number of compounds of Ligand’s choice that have exhibited “field
activity.” Article 12.2 If Warner-Lambert concludes that Ligand’s work in the research phase is
not satisfactory, it can terminate the agreement at its sole discretion. It would have exclusive
rights to develop a certain number of background technology compounds in the field, and it could
choose which; the rights to the others would revert to Ligand. If Warner-Lambert is successful,
Ligand would be entitled to its milestone payments and royalties. Article 12.8.
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and decision-making shift to it: The JRC’s role ends with the completion of the research
phase. Under the agreement, the JRC recommends which compounds to pursue, but the
decision to go forward rests with Warner-Lambert’s sole discretion. Warner-Lambert
promises to “use diligent efforts to pursue the Clinical Development and
commercialization of each Collaboration Lead Compound at its own expense”; however
it “shall have the sole discretion to determine (a) which Products to develop or market or
to continue to develop or market, (b) which Products to seek regulatory approval for, and
(c) when and where and how and on what terms and conditions, to market such Products
in the Territory.”101

The gap between contract formation and the appearance of a marketable drug is,
we saw, likely to be more than a decade.102 So the nature of that drug and its potential
value (clinically and financially) is unknown at the time of contracting. The uncertainty
is reflected in the manner in which Ligand is compensated. First, as noted, it was to be
paid for some fraction (perhaps all) of the FTE assigned to the task. Second, it would be
paid a fixed fee upon the initial screening of the Warner-Lambert compound library; if
Warner-Lambert chose to go ahead with the Extension term, Ligand would receive an
additional fixed fee. These could be labeled milestone payments, although the contract
does not do so. The agreement did establish a number of specific milestones, and, upon
reaching each milestone, Ligand would receive an additional payment. Finally, if the
research produced marketable products, Ligand would receive royalty payments on sales.

Warner-Lambert might decide not to proceed to the development stage for a
variety of reasons. The most significant is a genuine belief that the project would fail to
yield a commercially viable outcome. Even if Warner-Lambert believed the project
viable, it might want to defer development in favor of a more promising alternative in
another field. Or it might act opportunistically, feigning disappointment with the intent
of renegotiating the financial terms. Which of these alternatives in fact motivated
Warner-Lambert’s decision to abandon might well be difficult for Ligand even to
101
102
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observe, let alone to verify. This difficulty is addressed by giving Ligand a matching
option. If Warner-Lambert decided not to proceed with the development of a particular
“collaboration lead compound,” then Ligand would have the right to develop and
commercialize it.103 To decide whether to exercise its option, Ligand would need only to
be able to assess the commercial viability of the product; realistically, it would have to
convince a replacement partner of the product’s viability. Of course, the later in the
process Warner-Lambert exercises its option to abandon, the more observable should be
the product’s viability, and the more effective Ligand’s matching option in deterring
opportunism.

IV. A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL COLLABORATION AND CO-DESIGN

As we discussed in Part II, transactions involving collaborative innovation across
organizational boundaries have distinctive features affecting their contractual structure.104
In particular, the design and specification of product characteristics cannot be contracted
for ex ante; rather, these will result from repeat collaboration by employees of both firms.
The contracting problem is to craft a structure that a) induces efficient, transactionspecific investment by both parties, b) establishes a framework for iterative collaboration
and adjustment of the parties’ obligations under conditions of continuing uncertainty—
responding, that is, to coordination cascades, and c) limits the risk of opportunism that
could undermine the incentive to make relation-specific investments in the first place.

The governance structures in the three contracts we examine incorporate a mix of
formal contract and informal mechanisms. Successful collaborative innovation requires
ample knowledge of the collaborating parties’ capabilities and substantial confidence in
the parties’ future cooperative behavior. Neither the knowledge nor the confidence can
be acquired or assured by formal contract alone. At the same time, the commercial
context makes it infeasible to build up both over time through repeated exchanges policed
103

Article 5.3.1. Ligand’s right is qualified; it cannot go forward if Warner-Lambert is
commercializing the compound for another use or has a competing product (either existing or in
the pipeline).
104
See TAN supra.
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by the expectation of future dealings.105 In the arrangements of interest here, the
innovative product (or products) must be created early in the relationship; there is thus no
assurance of a number of future rounds sufficiently large that the expectation of a longterm relationship and the discipline of repeated dealings will protect against opportunistic
behavior.106 Instead, in these contracts, formal contracting operates importantly to
facilitate the development of informal contracting structures that police the parties’
expectations of capability, cooperation, and trust.107

Such mechanisms would be unnecessary if we assumed that these new
collaborative arrangements operate in a contractual state of nature, in which good-faith
cooperation can be expected from an arm’s length partner, without effective enforcement
and despite the parties’ inability to specify the substance of their joint efforts. We make
no such assumption. Rather, as we explain more fully in Part IV.C, process-oriented,
formal contracting supports the rapid development of informal contracting techniques
that address in turn the substantive elements of the parties’ performance. In the end, the
same parties that must cooperate to create the innovation also must bargain noncooperatively over how the gains created by that innovation are shared; and in some--perhaps many---cases, the collaborative effort will be less successful than anticipated--the
delay of delivery of the Boeing 787 because of slow performance by some suppliers
being a stark current example.108 Thus, cooperation does not eliminate tension or
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See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance 16
(2004).
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This is the “folk theorem” of non-cooperative game theory. See, e.g., Id. at 61; Drew
Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with
Incomplete Information, 54 Econometrica 533 (1986).
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Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as
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executives involved in the contracting process, rather than assessing the actual contractual
techniques that create and sustain the relationship. Thus, our focus here on actual contracts and
contracting techniques extends their insightful intuition.
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See, e.g., Boeing Delays 787 Debut due to Supply Chain and Assembly Problems, Los
Angeles Times, April 10, 2008, available at https://articles. latimes.com/april/10/2008/business/
fi-boeing10.
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conflict;109 the package of interrelated formal and informal contractual techniques
described below allows the cooperation necessary for iterative collaborative innovation
while also allowing the parties to accommodate their conflicting interests in division of
joint gains.

A. Transactional Variations in Collaborative Contract Design.
In this Part, we argue that the characteristic differences in the new contractual
patterns we observe are driven by the nature of the barriers to ex post opportunism, which
in turn are dictated by the substance of the transaction. The structure of contracts for
collaborative innovation differ most importantly depending on whether the contemplated
collaboration is long-term---involving an ongoing stream of interactive innovations---or
whether it involves a discrete project aimed at producing a single innovation such as a
patentable product or process. As we will see, in the former case the barrier to ex post
opportunism arises from the collaboration process itself: The continued presence of
uncertainty makes impossible the ex ante allocation of ex post decision power through
assigning to one party options to take action like termination. In the discrete project
setting, informal mechanisms operating during the collaborative period discourage
opportunism—in particular, the appropriation of jointly produced information for private
purposes-- but the parties have to fear opportunistic renegotiation once the cooperative
stage of the project is completed. The only issue then remaining is division of the gains
from prior cooperation. As a result, an explicit constraint on opportunism must be
employed; but at this stage, the uncertainty having been resolved, the contract theory
solution of allocating rights to decision-making is feasible.

Contracting for long-term collaborative innovation is particularly well illustrated
by the Deere-Stanadyne agreement,110 which is almost entirely focused on building
knowledge of Stanadyne’s capabilities as a collaborator in future innovation. To be sure,
the agreement provides the terms of actual purchases, should Deere in fact make them,
but the agreement itself does not commit Deere to purchase anything at all. Instead, the
109

O’Sullivan, supra note __ at ___, details the wide range of conflict that is possible in even a
successful collaborative contract for innovation.
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bulk of the work is done by non-contractual programs that create settings for Stanadyne
and other suppliers to demonstrate their capacity for collaboration over time by ascending
the ranks of favored suppliers. The agreement plainly contemplates a long-term
relationship between Deere and Stanadyne, despite the impossibility of specifying what
products will turn out to be needed in the face of the uncertain future of Deere’s market.
As each party learns about the other’s capabilities and character, the costs of extracting
private benefits at the risk of undermining collective gains continue to rise.

The Apple-SCI agreement presents a mixed case between an explicit, three-year
supply contract and an implicit, long-term contract that contemplates collaborative
innovation.111 Recall that in this agreement the three-year, explicit supply arrangement
supported Apple’s sale to SCI of Apple’s manufacturing plant.112 In the short run, the
product that SCI would manufacture for Apple was fully specified: the agreement
contemplated a turnkey sale to SCI with SCI immediately charged with producing 60
percent of Apple’s requirements for precisely the same computers Apple produced at the
same plant until the sale. However, that product would evolve over time in step with
changes in markets and technology, with the differences from the original specifications
accumulating. The agreement provided an elaborate planning process to ensure that the
manufacturer and assembler (SCI) and the seller of the product (Apple) would jointly
address the changes in the manufacturing/assembly process and in the product. The
process calls for continued improvement in performance and cost through collaboration
and jointly determined benchmarking.

As Apple’s three-year purchase commitment winds down, the explicit terms of
the contract no longer protect SCI’s investment in the plant from the threat of termination
by Apple. At the same time, Apple’s own exposure grows as the manufacturing process
reflects increasingly more input by SCI through the co-design process, and therefore a
more and more complex bundle of explicit and tacit knowledge. As a result, at one time
or another, either party may be in a position to extract a larger part of the gain from the
111
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relationship by threatening to withhold further cooperation. While each party makes a
front-end specific investment---SCI in buying the plant and Apple in relinquishing
control over a large part of its computer production---these threats may be credible
because the specific investments are not necessarily symmetric; each party is vulnerable
to hold-up at different times during the collaborative period.

Thus, a co-design relationship in the prototypical design and adaptation
arrangement has to address the traditional hold-up problem associated with specific
investment, but must do so in an environment where ex post decision rights are not
contractible ex ante – the iterative and collaborative process makes it impossible to
specify what decisions will need to be made. For the project to work, the parties must
rely on an informal arrangement to constrain opportunistic renegotiation of the division
of the value created by success during the three-year period of the contract, and in setting
the terms of the parties’ relationship thereafter.

Contracting for a discrete project, which contemplates collaboration during the
development stage, but allows for opportunism when the development stage is
completed, is well illustrated by the Warner-Lambert - Ligand agreement.113 Here the
contract contemplates a joint effort to develop pharmaceutical products having specified
capabilities, with Ligand playing the leading role in the research and development stage
and Warner-Lambert playing the primary role in the commercialization of the compounds
– clinical trials, FDA approval and the like. The problem is that once the compound is
developed – once the collaborative effort has been completed---Warner-Lambert seems to
be in a position to take advantage of the sequential structure of the arrangement. After
Ligand has performed its portion of the effort to identify particular compounds, WarnerLambert’s must initiate the regulatory process and commercialization, which enormously
increases its financial commitment. At that point, the potential for opportunistic
renegotiation resurfaces. Warner-Lambert might seek to renegotiate downward the
previously contracted royalty terms through which Ligand will share in the value created
by the collaboration. At this stage of the relationship, uncertainty has been resolved and
113
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the respective decision rights of the parties are therefore contractible---that is, there is a
discrete decision to go forward with commercializing the product rather than a series of
iterations as in the collaborative stage. Hence, an explicit contractual device –the
assignment of decision rights through the use of options -- is both necessary and feasible.

B. Coordination Cascades and the New Governance Mechanisms
In the following discussion, we show that the collaborative process is structured
to produce information about the parties’ capabilities and their capacity for cooperation.
The innovative governance terms of these co-design contracts (detailed specification of
the collaboration and dispute resolution mechanisms rather than specification of longterm price and quality terms) are driven by the parties’ investment in the information that
results from collaboration.

1. The Function of The Collaborative/Learning Phase.
a. Iterative Investments in Information. --- Our three illustrative contracts--Deere-Stanadyne, Apple-SCI, and Warner-Lambert-Ligand---share a common feature.
Each establishes formal governance structures: processes of interaction and dispute
resolution. One might imagine many reasons for writing down adaptation protocols: The
process builds consensus, enhances learning, minimizes misunderstanding, and the like.
But none of those reasons explains why the elaborate governance structures in these
contracts are made part of a formal contract. The first step, therefore, is to find a
theoretical framework that addresses that question.

The role of the contract as a nexus for the parties to invest in learning about each
other’s capabilities is seen most starkly in the Deere-Stanadyne agreement, where it is the
only binding element of the contract. From Stanadyne’s or a new supplier’s perspective,
the contract is an invitation to enter the Achieving Excellence program, though which the
parties will learn about each other, and Deere’s experience will move the supplier up the
supplier status ladder. The parties’ investments in the relationship grow as the process
continues, which provide the supplier the assurance that Deere will place orders with it.
Recall that neither the contract itself, nor the Achieving Excellence program, obligates
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Deere to purchase any product at all. In short, the contract operates entirely as a
governance structure that facilitates learning about the parties’ capabilities.

From this perspective, the Deere-Stanadyne contract resembles a more famous
contract that over the years has been the focus of a great deal of academic attention---the
General Motors-Fisher Body supply contract for the supply of auto bodies to GM in the
1920s. As Victor Goldberg has recently shown, the General Motors-Fisher Body supply
contract was in fact legally unenforceable (a fact that previously had been missed in the
large literature that concerns the contract), which the lawyers who wrote the contract
would have known.114 Thus, this more famous contract operated like the DeereStanadyne contract: as a way of organizing the parties’ learning and continued
collaboration, and their expectations with the investment protected by ever increasing
mutual dependency.

A governance arrangement is also at the center of the Apple-SCI agreement. The
parties commit to prepare a product plan, which will contain the specifications, quality
requirements, price schedule and other terms. The contract gives the parties joint
responsibility for all manufacturing design and equipment technology, testing, tooling
and the like. SCI controls the test engineering process,115 but Apple monitors, requiring
progress reports, pre-production review and progress monitoring to achieve preproduction deliverables.116 The formal contract thus specifies an iterative process, in
which the parties cooperate in designing the product and the manufacturing process.
Thereafter, the contract allocates initial responsibility to SCI for test engineering while
Apple monitors their performance and receives progress reports leading to an agreement
on product characteristics and the manufacturing process, the substance of which is not
specified in the contract. Only after Apple signs off on the pre-production deliverables
114

Victor P. Goldberg, Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? The GM-Fisher Body Contract, Indus. &
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115
Article 5.2
116
Article 5.3

53

does real production begin. The parties agree to co-engineer product cost reductions, set
goals and meet quarterly while production is underway. At each step in the preproduction process, the parties learn about each other’s technical capacity to accomplish
the necessary design tasks, abilities to cooperate in a productive fashion, to share
information readily, and to effectively manage the employees involved despite the nonhierarchical characteristics of the relationship. This process takes on greater and greater
importance with time. As the product evolves in response to technology and market
changes, legacy specifications and processes become less important; the collaborative
process represents the future.

Paralleling the iterative co-design process, the Apple-SCI contract also specifies a
dispute resolution process, which appears to develop information about each party’s
character. The contract provides that each party designates one person to be the single
operations manager for the day-to-day administration of the agreement. When the two
individuals cannot resolve an issue, the issue moves up (and then back down) the
hierarchies in a fashion that must be observable to each company’s designee, if the
process is to work. And of course, another critical piece of information---whether it
works---also will be observable.

The Apple - SCI agreement thus has parallel formal structures that function to
provide critical information about the characteristics central to the success of a project
requiring collaborative innovation: do the parties have the technical skills, do they have
the skills necessary to manage cooperation and, finally, what is their dispute resolution
style---do they cooperate or do they fight? The continued interaction over the initial three
year period, especially as the results of the collaboration represent a higher percentage of
the product being produced, leads to increasing information about each of these
dimensions.

The Warner-Lambert-Ligand agreement has similar explicit terms that dictate a
structure for the continued interaction of the parties, which in turn results in a learning
process similar to that in the Deere-Stanadyne and Apple -SCI agreements. During the
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first stage of the contract, Ligand uses its proprietary technology to identify compounds
that hold promise for estrogen therapy. Warner-Lambert then has the option, based on
Ligand’s performance, of extending the arrangement into a developmental period, when a
“Joint Research Committee” composed of three representatives from each firm manages
further research. Decisions must be unanimous; disagreements within the committee are
resolved in conference between one senior manager from each company. Both parties
have a large incentive to collaborate in the pre-exercise period, and to learn about the
other party’s capabilities and characteristics. Ligand’s incentive is to provide enough
information to cause Warner-Lambert to exercise its option to continue the project.
Warner-Lambert’s incentive is that the value of its option goes up as it gains more
information and is better able to predict the probability distribution of the payoffs to
further investment in compounds identified.117

As suggested above, at this stage the three contracts share a common structure –
explicit mechanisms with respect to collaboration and dispute resolution. Thus, during
the collaboration period, the production of information about the contracting parties is
supported by the formally specified collaboration and dispute resolution processes.
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The option to extend also operates as a valuable right to abandon the project, either because
the project is not working or because Warner-Lambert is not satisfied with Ligand’s performance.
See TAN __ supra. In two recent articles, Robinson & Stuart explore the role of networks in
supporting reputational sanctions in biotech strategic alliances. Robinson & Stuart, Financial
Contracting, supra note __; Robinson & Stuart, Network Effects, supra note --. The articles
conclude that the centrality of the biotech company in the industry network of alliances is the key
to explaining both the use of non-verifiable contract terms like best efforts and the commitment to
treat the alliance as seriously as the biotech does other alliances in the governing contracts.
Centrality is treated as a proxy for reputation; the conclusion is that reputation operates as an
implicit enforcement mechanism. While we recognize the role of reputation as one element of
switching costs, we remain skeptical about the extent to which reputation can carry the weight
Robinson and Stuart assign to it. Most important, it is extremely difficult for third parties,
however well connected, to observe the conduct of the parties. Suppose a venture fails. Given the
very low likelihood of finding a successful drug, the most reasonable inference is that the
outcome is the result of bad luck, not poor skills or bad faith. From this perspective, reputation is
hard to gain, but it is also hard to lose. Both require repetitive results to separate the signal from
the noise. From a contracting for innovation perspective, a better explanation for the use of terms
that are difficult to observe or verify is to help set expectations for the nature of the parties’
ongoing collaboration. The point is not to impose a standard that will trigger sanctions, but to
identify a goal that will help organize the collaborative effort. See Oliver Hart & John Moore,
Contracts as Reference Points, working paper 2007, available at SSRN:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=944784.
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b. The Role of the Contract Referee Mechanism. --- Despite the central role of the
collaborative/learning phase in providing the parties valuable information about each
others character, it cannot guarantee a cooperative outcome. Common experience
teaches that transactions that rely on informal enforcement can break down; relational
enforcement requires that each party be able to observe and properly characterize the
other’s behavior. This transparency dissipates when adaptations are complex and the
sequence of performances are interrelated, precisely the circumstance in contracts for
collaborative innovation, where debate over the right strategy is to be expected. Then the
parties’ signals are noisy: they do not perfectly demonstrate whether the disagreement is
in good faith, part of the cooperative process or, instead, an indication of opportunism. In
complex interactions, disputes may or may not reflect a failure to cooperate; what one
party intends as a cooperative response---“good idea but what about. . .”---may be
mistakenly interpreted as a defection.118 Lacking clarity, either party may mischaracterize
the other’s actions. Under these circumstances, without the necessary linkage between
action and response, reciprocity will be a less effective mechanism for enforcement.

The risk of misinterpreting the other party’s actions is mitigated in our exemplar
contracts by what we call the “contract referee” mechanism. This part of the governance
structure typically combines three key elements: a) the commitment to share and
exchange information during the collaboration,119 b) the assignment of decision rights to
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If one party mistakenly observes a defection when the other party intended to cooperate, a titfor-tat strategy will collapse into repetitive retaliation. For an accessible account of the problem,
see Jonathan Bender, Roderick M. Kramer & Suzanne Stout, When in Doubt: Cooperation in a
Noisy Prisoner’s Dilemma, 35 J. Conflict. Res. 691 (1991).
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Research Plan. Both commit to provide resources necessary to carry out the Plan (Art. 2.1).
Each agrees to allocate XX FTEs to the Plan (Art. 3.3). All collaboration discoveries and
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records. Similarly, the Apple/SCI contract provides that the parties will co-engineer product cost
reductions, setting goals and meeting every three months during the term.(Art. 10.6). SCI agrees
to share all production cost information and Apple agrees to share all marketing forecasts.(Art.
10.9). The parties co-design lead time reductions.(Art. 11.7)
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a joint project management team subject to a unanimity rule,120 and c) the appointment of
“referees”-- representatives from each firm charged with resolving disputes.121 This
mechanism has several effects. First, the referees provide information concerning the
nature of a complex interaction that others cannot obtain directly. A referee can clarify
misunderstandings early, avoiding false negatives---i.e., the interpretation of the other’s
behavior as a defection. When she finds that a defection has indeed occurred, a referee
can, by “blowing the whistle” while providing for a fast and low-cost resolution to the
dispute, forestall disproportionate responses by the aggrieved party. These steps promote
the development of a cooperative equilibrium and reinforce the “lock in” effects that have
been experimentally observed.122 The referee also serves as an informal disciplining
mechanism. Superiors are unlikely to look with favor on subordinates who send
problems up the line for resolution. The subordinates’ job was to resolve problems, not
escalate them.

Second, the use of collaborative teams also disciplines shirking, particularly if
there is a unanimity requirement and all will be punished for the sins of a few.123 Finally,

120

While a unanimity rule is common to many of these contracts, it is not an essential feature.
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face angry customers when there has been a late or defective performance. The
salesmen do not enjoy this and will put pressure on the production personnel
responsible for the default. If the production personnel default too often, they
will be fired.
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the collaboration process produces symmetrical information about two key variables–the
value created by the collaboration and the preferences for reciprocal cooperation. So
long as both parties are symmetrically informed and temptations to play chicken are
muted, then collaborative interaction---Coasian bargaining---will lead to efficient
decisions.

In what follows, we focus on the potential for opportunism resulting from both the
collaborative and pie-splitting phases of the transactions, and on the characteristic
responses. We take up the collaboration and its consequences in deterring both ongoing
and endgame opportunism in turn.

2. Mechanisms for Deterring On-Going Opportunism
a. Building Switching Costs during the Collaborative/Learning Phase. --- Central
to our analysis of these new arrangements is the role of switching costs – costs that a
party must incur to change from one counterparty to another.124 The term is connected
most directly in the literature with the inquiry whether rigorous initial competition
adequately substitutes for the absence of competition after the first purchase;125 but it also
appears in accounts of search costs,126 path dependency,127 first mover advantage,128 or

Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc.
Rev. 1 (1963). Macaulay also described feedback mechanisms where buyers issue “report cards”
to management of sellers, report cards that can then be used to discipline personnel.
124
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In; Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 Handbook of Industrial Organization 1970 (M.
Armstrong & R. Porter, eds. (2007)(defining switching costs).
125
See Paul Klemperer, Switching Costs, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economic 125 (2nd ed,
S. Durlauf and L. Blume, eds. 2008)(central question in literature is whether ex ante competition
substitutes for standard period by period competition).
126
Search costs refer to the costs associated with simply finding out what other parties offer
competitive goods and at what price. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 630 (1979).
127
In a path dependent environment, factors such as increasing returns and network externalities
result in an equilibrium that may not be the “most” efficient. Initial conditions, determined by
serendipity or factors traditionally viewed as non-economic, such as culture or politics, can move
the system down a particular path. Later on, moving off that path – switching – to a better
position may be extremely difficult because of large transition costs. W. Brian Arthur, Positive
Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92-99 provides an accessible survey of the
concept.. For discussions in an institutional context, see Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law
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reputation.129

For our purposes, the common core is the idea that information costs—for

example the costs of learning whether a supplier is good at learning to collaborate, and
can be counted on to act in good faith in hard times--can create barriers to replacing one
party to a contract with another. In a deep spot market such substitution is costless. But in
markets where learning about the quality of potential substitute suppliers and their
products is time consuming and expensive, there can be significant barriers to exiting a
relationship. The switching costs of interest to us here, however, have two additional
characteristics. First, the raising of barriers to exit is not simply a feature of the context
or market, as in search costs; nor is it the result of a unilateral effort by one side to make
it difficult for others to exit, as with first mover advantages. Switching costs in our sense
are produced, rather, by a joint effort of the parties – an instrumental effort that is central
to the structure of the relationship. As the Deere-Stanadyne contract discussed above
illustrates, the parties make large investments in relation-specific information concerning
each other’s capabilities that would be lost if the relationship terminated, and which
would have to be duplicated with any new supplier. Second, these investments are made
gradually, rather than all at the outset of the relationship. In effect, the switching costs in
the contracts we analyze here increase in step with the learning generated by the project.
In this sense they are inherent in the collaborative effort.

Precisely how do switching costs constrain opportunism during the
collaborative/learning phase of the contract? Recall that the parties’ efforts are not
contractible because of the need for continuous mutual adaptation as collaboration
resolves uncertainty one step at a time. We have seen that the formal mechanisms of our
three contracts induced the parties to develop information about their respective

and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 647-53 (1996); S. J. Leibowitz & Stephen Margolis,
Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 205, 206-08 (1995); and Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995).
128

See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY (1999).
129
In circumstances where third parties cannot perfectly observe the conduct of parties to a
contract, one party exiting the relationship may raise questions about that party’s reliability that
require investment by potential contracting parties in order to answer. Thus, that a party risks
reputation costs by exiting is simply a particular information cost associated with switching.
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capabilities and develop the human capital necessary for successful collaboration. But
the flip side of this reciprocal learning, and the coordinate development of collaborative
skills, is that each party successively raises its switching costs--the longer the interaction,
the more each party knows about the other, the higher the switching costs, and the greater
the constraint on opportunism. Switching costs may also be increased by the industry
context; they rise as the technology race in a given industry intensifies and as the delay
associated with reproducing the information necessary to work effectively with a
different supplier or customer becomes more costly. Thus, both contract and context
makes backing out costly for one or both of the parties. In many environments, switching
costs or barriers to exit are understood as unfortunate frictions that undermine access to
competitive alternatives. In the cases we examine, however, switching costs result from
deliberate contractual choices designed to structure the parties’ relationship efficiently.

Consider the Deere-Stanadyne agreement. As we have already stressed, two
elements of the relationship serve to build switching costs as the parties invest in
information about each other’s capabilities for innovation, cooperation, and dispute
resolution style.130 First, with the passage of time, Deere’s products and the parts being
supplied by Stanadyne evolve in response to changes in the market, changes in
technology, and the parties’ joint innovation. The differences between the initial product
(and the process by which it was produced) and the current one is thus a measure of the
growing size of the switching costs resulting from the parties’ investment in learning
about each other. Second, the structure of the Achieving Excellence program, which
contemplates the supplier’s rise in status with the passage of time and the growth of
Deere’s experience, provides a formal parallel process: rank in the hierarchy of supplier
classifications increases as switching costs grow.

The Apple-SCI agreement reflects a similar role for switching costs as a
constraint on opportunistic claims of too much of the gain from collaborative innovation.
To the extent that Apple’s other contractual suppliers could not immediately expand their
production or were less effective at collaborative innovation, adding a new supplier to
130

See TAN __ supra.
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replace SCI would be costly for Apple for three reasons: a) The delay in securing another
supplier given that the specifications and production technology had been co-engineered
with SCI, and necessarily reflect the idiosyncrasies of SCI’s capabilities; b) Apple’s lack
of knowledge about the capabilities of potential new suppliers that it had concerning
SCI; and c) Apple’s need to learn about the way potential replacements handled disputes,
where such knowledge can only develop iteratively over time. Even expanding the
production assigned to an existing supplier is costly because, by reducing the number of
suppliers, it gives the remaining suppliers greater leverage and reduces the number of
partners in innovation.

As each party’s switching costs rise, the relation between them more closely
approximates a bilateral monopoly. At the limit it resembles a chicken game---even
though both have high switching costs, there is a temptation to bluff defection so as to
secure a larger portion of the ex post surplus. This is where the dispute resolution
process becomes salient. It provides the opportunity for an iterative learning process
concerning each party’s dispute resolution style – whether they play a cooperative or
chicken game. To the extent that styles are not greatly malleable131---that is, people (and
institutions) do not easily switch from cooperators to defectors---then the explicit contract
provisions covering dispute resolution serve the same learning function along this
dimension as the explicit contract provisions governing the staffing, budget and
interaction of the collaborative innovation effort.

In sum, our exemplar contracts systematically generate symmetrical investments
in information through governance mechanisms designed to create knowledge about the
output and, simultaneously, about each other’s capacity to cooperate, both in solving
problems and in resolving the inevitable disputes. A plausible hypothesis, therefore, is
that these contracts are self-enforcing in the standard fashion: either the parties are
relying on reputational sanctions (also a form of switching costs), or on the overhang of
131

The behavioral literature suggests that these preferences are quite stable. Robert E. Scott, A
Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Contracts, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1641(2003) (discussing
comfort agreements and other informal agreements to agree that provide key information about
the parties’ preferences to cooperate).
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future interactions – cheating by a party in one round will be punished by the other in the
next---to make their promises credible. Indeed, the analogous practice of firms issuing
legally unenforceable “comfort letters” to prospective lenders has been explained as a
reputational signal that makes the agreements self-enforcing by establishing the party’s
obligations even if there is no formal enforcement mechanism.132

But the contracts in our group do not square easily with this common
understanding of the domain of self-enforcing agreements. The Deere-Stanadyne and the
Apple-SCI agreements are plainly intended to be long-term supply arrangements, but the
source of the constraints on opportunism as the supply relationship goes forward is not
readily apparent. First, reputational sanctions---that is, that potential replacement
suppliers will be more skeptical of doing business with an opportunistic buyer---depend
on assumptions concerning the observability of the supplier’s conduct to potential
suppliers which rest, in turn, on conditions that are difficult to sustain.133 These
conditions may not be met or only partially met in the settings of these contracting
parties. Indeed, reputational sanctions are best seen as a special, and especially context
sensitive, case of switching costs.

The transactions represented by the group of co-design contracts are, for the most
part, interactions in heterogeneous markets where reputational constraints are thought to
be quite weak.134 In such an environment, reputation alone is an inadequate means of
132

Rene Sacasas & Don Wiesner, Comfort Letters: The Legal and Business Implications, 104
Banking L. J. 313, 328 (1987):
Legally vague promises and inferences from cautious language are not always
valueless in business....Custom shows that memorializing even a weak legal
commitment carries some moral and business weight. The letter can be shown to
others, and reputations can be injured by the writer’s breach of faith....Id.
133
See Gilson, supra note __, at __.
134
Reputations are most effective in small homogeneous communities, where non-cooperative
behavior quickly becomes common knowledge and sanctions against such behavior can be
effectively imposed. See e.g., Avner Grief, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from
Medieval Trade in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 287 (1998); Janet
Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative
to Contract Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349 (1981). Reputational sanctions can also be effective in
industries with established trade associations that can both identify the bad behavior and
coordinate sanctions. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the

62

credibly enforcing promises. Even if others can observe the contractual failure, it would
be difficult to learn the true reasons why the particular transaction broke down. Absent
much of the information the parties can learn from iterative cooperation, the mere fact of
breakdown is not sufficient to impose a reputational cost on either party. If informal (or
relational) enforcement is to be a satisfactory explanation for this innovative
collaboration, its domain therefore must be extended to encompass switching costs

Second, the contracts do not themselves try to detail the future relationship
between the parties beyond the initial arrangement. Thus, the expectation of a long-term
relationship does not appear to rest on the discipline of repeated dealings, the standard
foundation for relational contracts that do not depend on reputational sanctions. 135 More
precisely, they do not seem to be a tit-for-tat solution to a multi-round prisoners’ dilemma
in the form of a supply contract. Rather, the contract structure is designed to support
collaboration and co-design, not cooperation and retaliation. The prisoner’s dilemma
game would be quite noisy: cheating would be hard to detect because of the continual
uncertainty arising from the parties’ ongoing innovation.

b. Switching Costs as Screens for Reciprocity. A question we have posed earlier
recurs: Why do these contracts contain elaborate procedural mechanisms to govern
environments where the speed of adaptation renders largely ineffective any recourse to
standard legal enforcement? One hypothesis is that these agreements, in addition to
being designed for parties to learn about each other’s competence and about market
conditions, are designed to allow parties to learn about each other’s preferences to behave
reciprocally and to cooperate in resolving disputes.

Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1771-77 (1996); Lisa
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1745-54 (2001).
135
Neither contract contains the sort of explicit price and quantity adjustment provisions,
common to long-term contracts, which are designed to deal with ex post opportunism in the face
of either exogenous events or attempts to take advantage of the other party’s high cost of
changing to another supplier/customer. In the absence of these terms, instances of iterated
cooperative adjustment would be unlikely to emerge spontaneously.
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The experimental behavioral literature shows that contracting parties are
heterogeneous regarding their preferences for cooperation---a significant percentage
reward cooperation and punish defection, but an equally large percentage will act in pure
self-interest and behave opportunistically.136 The problem then is to identify who are the
cooperators and who are likely to behave opportunistically.137

At first cut, the willingness to write a contract that conditions on non-verifiable
procedural factors is not, by itself, a reliable signal that either party is a cooperator. But
the contracts in our group have an additional feature. The procedural mechanism that
generates information about the feasibility of the project itself also creates opportunities
to cooperate at early stages of the relationship, and therefore renders observable the
parties’ character with respect to dispute resolution, at a time when specific investments
are modest and switching costs are low.138 Thus, early reciprocation, which serves to
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There are two key findings of a substantial body of experimental evidence on people’s
propensity to reciprocate. First, many people respond cooperatively to generous acts, and,
conversely, punish non-cooperative behavior. Second, , the observed preference for reciprocity is
heterogeneous. Some people exhibit reciprocal behavior and others are selfish. Taking all the
experiments together – gathered from diverse countries and cultures – the fraction of reciprocally
fair subjects ranges from 40 to 60% as does the fraction of subjects who are selfish. For
discussion, see Ernst Fehr et al, Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental
Evidence, 65 Econometrica 833 (1997); Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness,
Competition and Cooperation, 114 Q.J. Econ. 817 (1999); Mathew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness
into Game Theory and Economics, 83 Am. Econ. Rev. 1281 (1993); Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gatcher, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 159
(2000). For applications of this experimental evidence to contract and international law, see
Scott, Self-Enforcing Agreements, supra note ---; Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, SelfEnforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wisc. L. Rev. 551; Robert
E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of
International Law (Cambridge 2006).
137
To be sure, the experimental evidence relates to the behavior of individuals and not to the
behavior of firms. Nevertheless, the collaborative process that these contracts stimulate is
undertaken by dedicated teams of individuals who are personally invested in the success of the
co-design initiative. Thus, if the behavioral literature on reciprocity is at all relevant to
institutions, it would be in the contracting environments we are describing.
138
There is anecdotal evidence that managers believe that preferences for reciprocity are stable
and can be observed even in institutional settings. John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff
report for example that manager believed that “ ‘[p] eople show their personality through their
actions in difficult times,’ so after a few transactions this manager selected a few customers to
concentrate on.” John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional
Public Order, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2421, 2432 (2000).
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gradually lock the parties into a relationship, signals that the parties intend to cooperate,
and provide information about their type.

There are two ways that the formal governance structure established in these
contracts can function to identify a contracting party’s type. First, the obligation to share
information in the collaborative/learning phase of the contract provides opportunities to
observe the behavior of the other in response to opportunities to reciprocate. This gives
each party the opportunity to acquire knowledge of the other’s propensities.139 To be
sure, some parties may attempt to “act reciprocally” during the initial collaborative
process only to turn to opportunistic behavior when the investments are much greater.
But, in addition to observation, the collaborative learning process serves to separate in
time the opportunity to reciprocate from the end-stage transaction that is contemplated. It
is thus an example of the expenditure of time for the purposes of communication, thereby
increasing the cost of switching.140 In this case, the transactors are not only subject to
observation, but the parties must spend considerable time and effort in executing portions
of an agreement that is effectively non-verifiable and thus can only be self-enforcing.
Since parties with preferences to cooperate are able to capture the returns to general
information about their type through an enhanced reputation for cooperation, they are
more willing to spend resources to provide this information.141 The expenditure of time
performing a non-verifiable promise is itself a signal: because these costs make it
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See George Akerloff, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Qu. J. Econ. 355, 366 (1970
139
See George Akerloff, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Qu. J. Econ. 355, 366 (1970).
140
A. Michael Spence, Time and Communication in Economic and Social Interaction, 87 Qu. J.
Econ. 651 (1973
141
Another way of expressing the point in the text is that an opportunist can perhaps dupe a single
contracting partner and capture a larger surplus but, once his type is revealed, he is less able to
replicate the transaction at low cost. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Screening, Education
and the Distribution of Income, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 283, 287 (1975). It must be stressed,
however, that establishing or eroding a reputation requires that the relevant behavior (or a
credible signal of it) be observable not only to one’s existing trading partners, but also to potential
trading partners, a more complicated issue. See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family
Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 633
(2007) (discussing the requirements of a viable reputation market).
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difficult for a competitor who lacked the characteristic nonetheless to imitate the
behavior, it may signal a preference for reciprocity.

Our examples of co-design contracts suggest that the widespread use of elaborate,
non-verifiable and therefore non-enforceable governance obligations may be in part a
function of their properties as screens for the parties’ willingness to engage in
cooperative behavior. The knowledge of the other parties’ capacities, and therefore the
cost of acquiring equivalent information about a replacement, increases in parallel with
iterative performance. This period of build up of switching costs ranges in our exemplar
contracts from fifteen months in the Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract to three years in
the Apple - SCI contract and potentially much longer in the Deere-Stanadyne contract.
This is the unique and innovative feature of these contracts: they use the process of
collaboration to generate new information in two ways–to create the innovative product
and to bind each party to the other in a process of symmetrical investments so that neither
one has a hold-up advantage over the other at any point in time. To be sure, the parties
are then in a bi-lateral monopoly and run the risk of chicken games in the predictable
event of disagreement. But this risk is reduced by the fact that the iterated co-design
process also contains a mechanism that allows early exit, for example, Deere’s right not
to purchase any product at all from a particular supplier, or Warner-Lambert’s right to
elect early termination of the project.

To summarize the argument to this point: A contract that requires relationspecific investments ex ante but where the resolution of uncertainty will require ex post
renegotiation will not work unless opportunism is effectively constrained. Assigning ex
post decision rights ex ante will not work in the face of ongoing collaboration and
uncertainly---one can not tell ahead of time to whom decision rights should be given.
The mutual raising of switching costs will constrain opportunism even in the face of
uncertainty. One function of the elaborate governance and dispute resolution
mechanisms in contracting for innovation is precisely to facilitate this mutual raising of
switching costs: The contracts provide a screening and learning process about the
parties’ propensities to behave opportunistically that would be costly to duplicate with a
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new partner.142 Thus, we see a braiding of explicit and implicit contracting that supports
a co-design contract: explicit provisions that create knowledge and routines that raise
switching costs and a dispute resolution mechanism that builds mutual knowledge of the
propensity to reciprocate and deters behavior that could undermine the cooperative
equilibrium. In this way, the collaborative mechanism that produces the information
necessary to the project’s success also provides the constraint on opportunism that allows
collaboration—and innovation—to continue.

3. Deterring Opportunism at the End-Stage: Dividing the Pie with Options.
Thus far, we have focused on situations where the relationship potentially is long
term, uncertainty continues, and there is no final period in which collaboration has ended.
However, in some contracts that contemplate collaborative innovation, the period for
collaboration has a predictable end, at which time the potential for opportunism reappears
because the parties face a division of the surplus created by the collaboration. Here the
contractual response that supports collaborative innovation by constraining opportunism
takes a different form.

If the parties’ relationship moves from a collaboration stage to an end stage, the
governance arrangements that operated to support collaboration no longer function.
Recall that the relational governance structure worked because information about the
collaborative process was symmetric and the parties could collectively discipline
opportunism. But once the period of collaboration ends, the potential for opportunism
reemerges. At this point, however, uncertainty is resolved and decision and control rights
are contractible ex post---they can be assigned by explicit contract. The exemplar
142

McMillan & Woodruff make a similar argument in discussing relational contracting in
underdeveloped markets with poor legal systems:
[b]ilateral cooperation may evolve in relationships via a process in which the potential
loss from having a trading partner defect is kept small in initial transactions and allowed
to increase as the relationship progresses. . . . Early in the relationship, the two sides of
the trading relationship test each other. As trading continues, experience with the trading
partner provides information…. The data show that longer-lasting relationships involve
significantly more trust. After two years of dealings, the amount of trade credit offered is
on average fourteen percentage points higher than at the start of the relationship.
McMullan & Woodruff, supra note – at 2432.
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contracts suggest, therefore, that parties may have learned to guard against the risk of
opportunism by writing contracts with two sets of terms: an implicit (and flexible) set of
terms that support self-enforcement where rights and obligations are not reasonably
contractible, and an explicit and precise set of terms for legal enforcement when decision
rights are contractible.

The Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract provides an illustration of the problem and
a response. As we have seen,143 Warner-Lambert has an incentive to insist ex post on
lowering the royalty payments to Ligand once it learns that the drug developed is
promising. In contrast, in the Apple - SCI contract the pricing terms are subject to review
after the production plan is executed, but it is expected that cooperative innovation will
continue so that high switching costs continue to constrain opportunism. The DeereStanadyne contract operates in a similar fashion. But once the collaboration process ends
and Ligand delivers a compound, Warner-Lambert no longer requires Ligand’s
cooperation, so switching costs are no longer relevant; a different mechanism for
constraining opportunism is necessary to support the overall collaborative innovation. In
this situation, the ex ante contract can supplement the high switching costs (including
reputation effects) operative during the cooperative phase with complementary explicit
provisions that assign designated decision rights to a specific party during the noncooperative phase.

The Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract illustrates the utility of nesting explicit
options---the allocation of sequential ex post decision rights among the parties to deal
with opportunism in the post-cooperative phase. The structure of the contract gives
Warner-Lambert an initial option, exercisable after the development period ends, to
extend the contract for another three years to develop the “lead collaboration compounds”
identified by Ligand during the prior fifteen months. If Warner-Lambert exercises its
option, it effectively owns the rights to the lead collaboration compounds, subject to a
hierarchy of license and royalty payments set out in the original agreement. This is a
point at which Warner-Lambert can act opportunistically ex post. Since Ligand can not
143

See TAN __ supra.
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further develop a lead collaboration compound itself, Warner-Lambert can threaten to
exercise the option to extend, but only at a lower royalty rate. To be sure, the ex ante
royalty arrangement gives Warner-Lambert a substantial economic incentive to exercise
its option to develop a promising project. But the typical “big pharma” has a much better
capacity to sustain a delay in developing a promising project than does an
undercapitalized biotech.144 Warner-Lambert’s reputation with other potential partners
might be impaired, as we argued above, a form of switching cost that may continue into
the end stage, but this depends on the motivation for Warner-Lambert’s renegotiation
being observable to other firms with whom Warner-Lambert might work in the future.145
Given the asymmetry in outside options, the parties have differing threat points, the
resulting chicken game would appear to favor Warner-Lambert over Ligand. What
explicit contract terms guard against this opportunistic threat to renegotiate?

This problem cannot be addressed simply by linking the royalty to the particular
results of the co-design collaborative process. The very point of the process is that the
parties cannot detail ex ante the different states of the world that the collaborative
innovation may reveal, so that one cannot write even a rough state contingent contract
linking royalties to outcomes (other than that the rates are in the end applied to sales). A
different explicit technique is necessary. In somewhat analogous situations like venture
capital contracting146 and movie development147---which also involve innovation without
the ability ex ante to condition shifting payouts on outcomes---the problem is addressed
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Because Warner-Lambert will receive the great majority of the proceeds from the
commercialization of a compound, one can argue that Ligand will not need to fear opportunistic
renegotiation of the royalty rate. The problem, however, is that the proceeds from the compound
is likely a small part of Warner-Lambert’s revenues, but a large part of Ligand’s revenues, which
affects the parties’ bargaining power. Additionally, a reduction in the royalty rate is attractive to
Warner-Lambert because it will be pure profit. Finally, the cost of delay may be of less
significance to Warner-Lambert. First, so long as the delay does not reduce the length of patent
protection, the cost is only a present value issue. Second, so long as Warner-Lambert’s
commercialization pipeline does not have an infinite capacity – that is, that other projects
compete for space in it – the cost of delay is only the difference, if any, between the value of the
Ligand developed project and the value of the project that replaces the Ligand project in the
queue.
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See TAN __ supra.
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147
Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 524 (1997).
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through nested options. This appears to be the technique used in the exemplar contracts
we observe.

The Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract creates an explicit nested options
mechanism that prevents opportunistic renegotiation at the end stage. If Warner-Lambert
does not extend, then the rights to compounds developed by Ligand employees remain
with Ligand. Of course, other large pharmaceutical companies to whom Ligand then
might market the compound would be concerned over the signal given by WarnerLambert’s decision not to exercise its option to extend. However, by this point in the
project, the commercial promise of the compounds identified by Ligand likely is
observable to other pharmaceutical companies. Thus, if the observability assumption is
correct, and if Warner-Lambert seeks to renegotiate the license and royalty fees
opportunistically, then Ligand can market the compound to other pharmaceutical
companies if Warner-Lambert declines to extend.

Of course, the potential for opportunistic renegotiation by Warner-Lambert does
not disappear when it exercises its option to extend. It can renegotiate at any point until
the compound clears the FDA---Warner-Lambert can threaten not to take the compound
through animal trials, clinical trials, etc., unless Ligand agrees to lower the licensing and
royalty rates. At this stage as well, the explicit contract structure addresses the problem.
Warner-Lambert has an option to abandon development of a compound during the
extension period, but the rights to that compound then revert to Ligand. Since the
commercial promise of the compound will be more transparent with every post-extension
stage, Ligand’s ability to market the compound to Warner-Lambert competitors will
increase accordingly, serving as a growing check on opportunistic renegotiations.

C. Risks and Rewards of Braiding Explicit and Implicit Contracts.
What are the consequences of a contractual innovation where parties write
contracts that contain some terms that are self-enforcing and others designed for legal
enforcement? The answer to this question depends on the possible effects of the
alternative means of enforcement on each other. A growing experimental literature is
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suggestive of the character of the interaction. First, the experimental evidence suggests
that the various means of self-enforcement---retaliatory threats, reputational sanctions,
and reciprocity---complement each other. For example, experiments have compared the
effort levels of subjects given a single, anonymous opportunity to respond to a generous
offer with the effort levels in a similar game in which repeated interactions created an
additional opportunity to retaliate against selfish behavior. 148 The results show that
repeated interactions cause a significant increase in the effort levels of the subjects.149

This result makes sense. Informal sanctions are imposed implicitly and ex post.
Thus, for example, a cooperator can punish a shirker’s defection after the fact without
risking offense by announcing in advance that there will be a sanction for defection.
Reciprocation also may lead to a virtuous cycle, in which engaging in cooperative
behavior increases one’s preference for more cooperative behavior.150 Successful
cooperation that generates a reputation for trustworthiness or produces returns in ongoing
transactions furthers self-interest and this feedback effect may strengthen the willingness
to reciprocate.151

How, then, do explicit contractual obligations interact with a governance structure
designed to screen for and motivate reciprocity? Here the data indicate that absent a
legally enforceable obligation, reciprocity---operating alone---generates high levels of
cooperative behavior.152 But once the entire relationship, including its implicit aspects, is
148

See Martin Brown, Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, Incomplete Contracts and the Nature of Market
Interactions, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper
No. 38 (2002).(comparing the effort levels of agents in a one-shot gift exchange game with the
effort levels in a similar game in which repeated interaction was an additional material outcome)
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subject to formal enforcement, voluntary reciprocity declines along with the overall level
of cooperation.153 These experimental results suggest that formal legal sanctions and
informal sanctions based on reciprocity may well conflict with each another. In other
words, formal contracting may “crowd out” behavior based on relational contracting.154

A careful examination of the experimental evidence shows, however, that the
crowding out phenomenon is complex. A number of studies have confirmed the
crowding-out hypothesis in interactions between individuals, where the parties must
choose either informal or formal enforcement: The choice of formal enforcement
uniformly suppresses reciprocity.155 But recent experiments show that, where there is
some probability that the same buyers and sellers will continue transacting in the next
period, formal enforcement that is limited only to the verifiable dimensions of the
agreement actually enhances cooperation in those dimensions of the agreement that are
non-verifiable.156

Assuming, as before, that these experimental results regarding individual behavior
also hold for behavior in the small teams at the core of the institutional designs we are
examining, the data point consistently in the same direction. Explicit contracting can
complement and support relational governance structures when the contracting parties
deploy it to supplement the implicit enforcement mechanisms. Thus, where, as in the
Warner-Lambert-Ligand contract, the explicit mechanisms are designed to legally
enforce only the verifiable terms of a contract, and where the parties believe in the
prospect of an on-going relationship, the evidence suggests that explicit mechanisms
designed to deter opportunism at the end stage of collaborative contracts may reinforce
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the patterns of trust and reciprocity, thereby enabling the parties better to enforce
themselves the non-verifiable portions of the relationship.

V. COMING FULL CIRCLE: CONTRACTING FOR INNOVATION AND THE THEORY OF THE
FIRM

Contracts for innovation create inter-firm governance structures, which in turn
can produce changes in the organization of the individual firms. The innovations these
contracts produce can substantially redirect the parties’ investment strategies, or lead to
the creation of new firms. It is thus in the nature of these agreements to blur the
distinction between contract and organization, or market and firm, that has been at the
core of efforts to construct a theory of the firm since Ronald Coase’s pioneering work of
in the 1930s.157 This brings us back to the second current gap between theory and current
practice that our contracting for innovation analysis identifies. In this Part, we suggest
how analysis of contracting for innovation may focus efforts to resolve key controversies
regarding the organization of economic activity that the diffusion of new forms of
cooperation in recent decades have made central.

A. From One-to-One to Many-to-Many: Current Understandings of the Boundaries of
the Firm
Coase’s original insight was to apply marginalist thinking to the organization of
transactions, and especially to the selection of the instruments governing them. In
determining whether and how to undertake the incremental or marginal transaction,
Coase reasoned, economic agents face a fundamental choice. They can turn to the market
for the required good or service. In that case, the costs of the transaction are the costs of
contracting---finding partners, agreeing on prices, addressing the need to assure both ex
ante and ex post efficiency, and so on. Alternatively, agents can produce the good or
service internally by establishing a corresponding hierarchy within the firm. Then the
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costs of transacting are the costs of establishing and operating a bureaucracy.158 The
relative transaction costs would vary with the nature of the transaction; all else being
equal, agents prefer in each case the lower cost transaction form. The nature of the firm,
now understood as the kinds of transactions for which it is the lowest cost provider,
would thus be revealed by the agents’ calculations of the costs and benefits of
substituting a property rights-based hierarchy for contract, or vice versa, in organizing the
relevant transactions.

An intuitively appealing way to operationalize this general idea is to distinguish
various types of transaction costs and identify patterns in their incidence that explain
salient features of industrial organization. This is precisely what Williamson did.159 He
argued that the asset specificity of complementary investments created the risk of costly
holdups, and that it was infeasible to mitigate that risk by drafting a complete contract
covering all the contingencies that might affect the division of returns from the joint
project. Hence, the costs of coordinating such investments through the market were
prohibitively high and the transactions were instead organized within the firm. The result
was the vertical integration widely observed up through the 1980s and that Chandler
famously chronicled.160

But, it turns out, Coase in the 1930s had anticipated and rejected on empirical
grounds precisely this analysis and the generalization to which it led. As he later
explained, managers were much less concerned by the prospect of hold-ups than he had
speculated they might be.161 If they worried about the problem at all, he reports, they
thought it largely susceptible to contractual remedies. He was particularly impressed by
the experience of A.O. Smith, a leader in industrial automation, based in Milwaukee,
which supplied a large share of General Motors’ auto frames for decades while
158
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continuing to operate as an independent company.162 Most recently, Coase has gone on
to argue that the canonical story connecting hold-ups and vertical integration—the final
take over of the Fisher Body Company in 1926 by General Motors—misconstrues the
motives of the transaction: On the new account General Motors’ aim was to collaborate
more closely with the Fisher brothers in managing innovative relations with suppliers—
an early variant of the relations described here—than to protect itself against the
(arguably non-existent) threat of a hold-up.163 This assessment, in turn, is consistent
with Goldberg’s conclusion that the GM-Fisher Body contract, like the Deere-Stanadyne
contract examined earlier, was legally unenforceable and that the parties knew it.164

Although we are sympathetic to Coase’s rejection of the Fisher Body story, and of
the generalization it is supposed to illustrate, his criticism is incomplete. Is the problem,
as he sometimes suggests, the insufficient attention to empirical detail in transaction cost
analysis?165 If so, what account of the pattern of transaction costs, and their connection
to governance instruments, fits the facts better than the hold-up story? Or is the problem
deeper, in the very effort to establish a parsimonious list of transactions inherently
“suited” either to markets or to firms? And if there is no such list, how, if at all, should
we think of the “nature” of the firm?

In a provocative review of the transaction-cost and property-rights literature on
the nature of firm, Holmström and Roberts broached this more thorough going critique a
decade ago.166 Their arguments can be seen as a generalization of Coase’s objections
(albeit a generalization that raises questions about the original dichotomy of market and
firm). Their conclusions invite further development in the light of our findings here.

162

Id. at ---.
Ronald H. Coase, The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and General
Motors, 15 J. Econ. & Mgmt Strategy, 255 (2006).
164
See TAN __ supra. Note that this makes the GM-Fisher Body contract analogous to the
Deere-Stanadyne contract.
165
Lafontaine, et. al, supra note __, surveys the empirical transaction cost literature.
166
See note ---supra.
163

75

Holmström and Roberts advance two claims. First, they argue that the
coordination of investments, as exemplified in the threat of hold-ups, is but one of the
types of governance concerns that managers must engage. Another pervasive concern
regards agency problems: ensuring that agents use the discretion they are accorded to
pursue the goals set by their principals, rather than pursuing their private interests. A vast
and venerable literature in economics, organizational sociology and law attests to the
centrality of this concern both within the firm and between the firm and its suppliers. Yet
another problem regards diffusion of knowledge relevant to improvement and innovation.
Here, too, a large literature in both economics and sociology documents management’s
ongoing efforts to create stable, rule-based structures to ensure the circulation of
knowledge which is itself too fluid and imperfectly understood—too tacit, as it is often
said—to be reducible to rules.167 Indeed, much of that literature argues that the chief
function of the firm is not to solve hold-up problems but instead to facilitate the flow of
the un-codifiable, living knowledge that animates innovation.168

Holmström and Roberts’ second claim goes to the relation between the kinds of
governance problems and the instruments available to address them. In transaction cost
economics, at its most reductive, this relation was one-to-one: Hold-up problems can
only be solved by vertical integration in the firm; the firm’s boundary therefore is
dictated by the breadth of hold-up problems.169 The core of Coase’s criticism of
transaction cost economics is that the link between the character of transactions costs and
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organizational form is less precise; there is more than one organizational response to
particular transactions costs. The relation is, at least, one to many: Hold-up problems
can be solved by contract (as in the case of A.O. Smith) as well as by vertical integration.
Holmström and Roberts’ suggest that the relation is many-to-many: There are various
governance tasks and various instruments for managing them. Each task can be
addressed by more than one instrument, and each instrument can, alone or in combination
with others, be used to address more than one task.

The core illustration of this many-to-many relation is Japanese-style
subcontracting in the automobile industry in the mid-1990s. Holmström and Roberts
note that, contrary to the predictions of transaction cost economics,170 the Japanese
subcontractors (and their emulators in other countries) invest in the co-design of
specialized parts and components, and in relation-specific equipment (such as expensive,
metal-forming dies) despite the hold-up and other risks such investments entail. But if
the organization of Japanese supply chains does not reflect recourse to vertical integration
to solve the holdup problem, neither does it reflect contract, at least as conventionally
understood. The contracts between the suppliers and their customers, Holmström and
Roberts write, “are short and remarkably imprecise, essentially committing the parties
only to work together to resolve difficulties as they emerge,” and to renegotiate prices
regularly.171 Rather, the governing mechanism is the “long-term, repeated nature of the
interaction,”172 based on shared understandings and expectations: a variant of Lamoreaux,
Raff, and Temin’s relational view of the new economy. This shared experience is
reinforced, at least in some cases, by supplier associations capable of facilitating the
imposition of reputational sanctions on powerful customers who neglect the obligations
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of reciprocity. But Holmström and Roberts also observe that within these long-term
relations the auto companies “carefully monitor supplier behavior---including cost
reduction, quality levels and improvements, general cooperativeness, and so on.” Thus,
long-term relations of the Japanese kind are (along with vertical integration and contract)
one of several possible responses to hold-up problems; and organizational structure can
comprehend all these responses, as well as address other incentive or governance issues
such as agency problems and the management of information flows.

Holmström and Roberts do not discuss the general relation of firms to markets in
light of the many-to-many mapping they find between contemporary governance tasks
and instruments. But it is clear that the original dichotomy of hierarchy and contract
cannot survive the proliferation of cases and relations they report. For one thing, there
are no governance tasks done only by firms or only by the market; vertically integrated
firms compete with firms that secure inputs or distribution by contracting with
independent suppliers or distributors. For another, there are entire classes of governance
mechanisms that simply cannot be usefully categorized as either hierarchy or contract.
Information flows in both firms and markets are often managed neither by hierarchy nor
contract, but rather by federated structures or peer-to-peer networks, such as supplier
clubs or benchmarking groups. Seen in this light, the essence or nature of the firm is not
to solve this or that governance problem. The firm does not in this sense have an essence
or nature: It bundles governance instruments as the calculus of advantage in particular
contexts suggests, and retains that form as a result of path dependency even as changed
circumstances cause new competitors to adopt different arrangements.

B. Contracting for Innovation and the Boundaries of the Firm
Our findings corroborate, help complete, and prompt extension of those of
Holmström and Roberts. First, contracting for innovation can be thought of as a further
development of the many-to-many relation of governance instruments to tasks. Instead
of matching several instruments to several problems, and vice versa, contracting for
innovation creates a single, novel regime that fuses and transforms elements of contract,
bi-lateral governance and hierarchical management. It uses this regime to coordinate
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investment, resolve agency problems and direct information flows in a context in which
the skills necessary for product development cannot be cabined within a single firm. The
key innovation is creating a regime in which the regular and reciprocal provision of
information about each party’s capacity and willingness to cooperate teaches the parties
how to collaborate more effectively, binding them more tightly to imprecisely defined
common projects through increased switching costs resulting from that process—or
alerting them to possible breakdowns before the costs of failure in the relation become
ruinous. The “short and remarkably imprecise” contracts of the Japanese style, when
braided with a governance process that supports mutual learning, become a regime that
generates quite precise expectations and obligations. The tacit knowledge of innovation,
often held to require the carefully controlled environment of the firm, is made explicit
enough to be reviewed across organizational boundaries (even if it is far from being fully
formalized) and thereby opens an entity to cutting edge technology lodged in other
entities. This regime is not a governance panacea or all-purpose tool adapted to all
occasions. Rather, as we have argued, it is particularly suited to situations where parties
with distinctly different but complementary capacities jointly undertake to explore, and
possibly exploit, an uncertain domain, a description that predicts the prevalence of this
organizational form in settings where innovation is central to success.

In speaking of contracting for innovation as a further development of many-tomany governance, we are looking backward and forward in debates about governance,
and in the evolution of governance instruments themselves. First, looking backward, we
mean to raise the possibility that the complex governance arrangements Holmström and
Roberts observed a decade ago were a precursor to (or at least inspiration for) contracting
for innovation. In particular, Japanese subcontracting and production methods were
widespread and prominently discussed in two industries—automobiles and electronics—
in the years before contracting for innovation emerged in both. It seems quite possible,
therefore, that firms in these industries experimented with ways to achieve “Japanese”
collaboration without relying on features of Japanese culture (high trust) or institutional
experience (supplier clubs) or Japanese-style corporate governance not easily transferable
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to their settings.173 Along the way, they would have stumbled upon the information
exchange and governance methods reported here; and having learned of the advantages of
these methods in practice, they would, sooner or later, have asked a lawyer to capture
their defining features in contracts with potential partners. Japanese subcontracting
would thus have evolved into contracting for innovation. Of course, this just-so story
must be verified, or replaced by a more accurate account; and in either case there remains
the problem of identifying the way in which contracting for innovation arose in the
pharmaceutical industry where, to our knowledge, the Japanese production model was
unlikely to have been immediately influential. But contracting for innovation came from
somewhere, and this seems a plausible hypothesis.174

Looking forward, a second and more fundamental point raised by the emergence
of contracting for innovation is that governance instruments have evolved—and almost
surely will continue to do so. Coase’s original contribution, though deeply informed by
knowledge of the precise practices of his day, was intended as a contribution to a
noncontextual economic theory. Its aim was “to discover why a firm emerges at all in a
specialized exchange economy.”175 Transaction cost economics, in effect, takes as the
field of analysis the era of (then) modern manufacturing: For that reason the Fisher Body
story of 1926 is presumed relevant to world of a half century later. To illustrate the limits
173
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of current explanatory schemes, Holmström and Roberts introduce a form of
governance—Japanese subcontracting—which happens to be new. But the novelty of
Japanese governance, and the continuing evolution of instruments revealed by the
diffusion of contracting for innovation, is theoretically significant in itself. It strongly
suggests that the list of governance instruments is open-ended. Or, looking backward and
forward, we can say that that firms and governance forms co-evolve, with adjustments to
new contexts by the firms leading to innovations in governance—which in turn change
the context to which firms adjust. On this view, of course, firms do not have essences.
More exactly, the firm in every epoch takes the shape necessary for the most pressing of
the prevailing governance problems: risk in the last century, uncertainty at the start of this
one.

There follows a final observation and qualification regarding these changes in
firm organization and governance instrument. In reporting on the emergence of a novel
governance instrument that supports new forms of cooperation, we underscore the
continuing importance of (changes in) context, not to suggest that the history of industrial
organization has or can come to an end. The firm, now as before, has a future, and that
future will be different from its past. For example, there are counter-tendencies even
amidst the general, current tendency to vertical dis-integration; some are likely to remain
marginal exceptions, others, perhaps presaging new developments, are reversions to
apparently superseded forms. Thus, as cell phones become on the one hand fashion items
and on the other mobile internet portals, Nokia, a leading producer is both (re)-integrating
into manufacturing—to cut the time to market for its fashion-sensitive products—and
opening its research operations to a wide range of collaborators—to scan for the
innovations needed to compete in the market for mobile portals.176 Even as U.S. steel
firms were divesting their holdings of iron ore, Mittal (now Arcelor/Mittal), a multinational offshoot of an Indian steel maker, was buying ore reserves to protect itself
against the possibility of world-wide limits to supply.177 It would be a surprise, given the
transformations of recent decades, if this shifting of firm boundaries did not produce
176
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further innovations in governance. Contracting for innovation is a new tool. The best
way to understand why it was made, and what it is good for, is to look carefully at the
problems it solves—and the ones it doesn’t.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, we have offered a hypothesis concerning how entities contract for
innovation across organizational boundaries as an alternative to vertical integration, and
also sought to place the contracting for innovation phenomenon in a more textured
account of a theory of the firm and of contract theory. The need for the elaboration of
theory was demonstrated by the practices that actually have developed in industries
driven by innovation, where the exigencies of doing business pushed practice ahead of
theory. Our analysis was illustrated and given plausibility by three exemplars of how the
practices of participants contracting for innovation illustrate the gaps in both of these
areas of theory. The next step is to move from plausibility to proof, which will require
both qualitative and quantitative data on parties’ efforts to contract for innovation
sufficient to give confidence that our account captures current practice, or to instruct us in
what we have missed. This will be our next project.
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